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ABSTRACT 
Fifty-four middle school age (sixth to eighth grade) 
children took part in a study designed to examine the effects 
of situational control and performance feedback on locus of 
control orientation. The subjects took part in a task situa-
tion in which they were asked to read three fictitious experi-
ments and decide from a list of ten results which ones were 
actually found in the experiment and which were not. Pre and 
post-task measures were obtained on two locus of control scales. 
The Locus of Control Scale For Success - Failure (Epstein and 
Komorita, 1971) was answered in direct relation to the task 
situation and provided a task specific measure of control 
orientation. The pre-task measure on this scale was obtained 
by giving the subjects a sample of the task to examine prior 
to the experimental manipulations. The Intellectual Achieve-
ment Responsibility Questionnair~ (IAR) (Crandall, et. al., 
1965) was used to obtain the subjects' control orientation for 
the academic achievement situation. The pre-testing was done 
in large groups and took place at least two weeks prior to the 
individual task situation and post-testing. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of three instruction groups: skill 
(personal control) oriented, chance (no personal control) ori-
ented, or no control orientation. Subjects were also randomly 
assigned to one of three feedback (falsified) groups: success, 
failure, or no feedback. This design yielded nine treatment 
groups with six subjects in each group. The hypotheses tested 
were (a) The experience of personal control (skill instructions) 
would lead to greater intern1l control orientation, while the 
experience of no personal control (chance instructions) would 
result in greater external control orientation. (b) Success 
feedback would bring about a shift toward a more internal con-
trol orientation and failure feedback would result in a greater 
external control orientation. The no control orientation 
instructions and the no feedback factors were used as controls 
on type of instructions and type of feedback, respectively, 
and were not expected to lead to any differential shifting in 
control orientation. No interaction effects were predicted. 
The test data were analyzed in a 3 X 3 X 2, mixed effects 
analysis of variance, with repeated measures on the pre and post-
task locus of control score factor. Separate analyses were 
performed on the Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure 
and on the r+ subscale, r- subscale, and total I score of the 
TAR. The results did not support the first hypotl1csis. Perso~~l 
control versus no personal control, as manipulated by ski!l-
chance instructions had no significant effects on locus of 
control scores. The results supported the second hypothesis 
fairly clearly Nith the Locus of Control Scale for Success-
Failure but not at all with the IAR. A significant trials X 
feedback interreaction with the Locus of Control Scale for 
Success - Failure scores was broken down and indicated that: 
(a) The failure and success groups changed differentially. 
(b) The failure and no feedback groups changed differentially. 
(c) The failure group changed significantly in a more external 
direction. (d) The failure group was significantly more 
external than the success group on the post-test, while there 
were no significant differences among the three feedback groups 
on the pre-test. The only significant finding with the IAR was 
an overall shift towards greater internality on the r- subscale 
and the total I score. Results were discussed in terms of the 
generalization and multidimensionality of the locus of control 
concept. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The locus of control construct grew out of Rotter's 
(1954) social learning theory. This theory stresses the inter-
action of four classes of variables: behaviors, expectancies, 
reinforcements, and psychological situations. The basic 
formula for behavior according to Rotter (1975) is that "the 
potential for a behavior to occur in any specific psychological 
situation is a function of the expectancy that the behavior will 
lead to a particular reinforcement in that situation and the 
value of that reinforcement (p. 57) .'' Locus of control refers 
specifically to the expectancy aspect of this formula and con-
sists of a continuum dimension from internal to external control 
orientation. The difference between these two orientations is 
in terms of the degree to which an individual perceives a re-
inforcement as being contingent upon his own behavior or his 
own relatively permanent characteristics (internal control) and 
the degree to which an individual perceives reinforcements as 
being contingent upon luck, fate, powerful others, or as being 
unpredictable because of the complexity of the forces surrounding 
him (external control) (Rotter, 1966). Rotter and his students 
subsequently developed scales designed to measure the generalized 
control expectancies which individuals develop through their 
unique history of reinforcements in specific situations (Phares, 
1955; James, 1957; Rotter, 1966). 
The concept of locus of control as a generalized expectancy 
raises questions as to what factors are involved in the develop-
ment of an individual's locus of control orientation and what 
factors contribute to the modification of this orientation once 
( 2 • ) 
it has stabilized. There has been a wide variety of research 
dealing with locus of control since Rotter's initial formulation 
of this concept. Several bibliographies have been published 
(Throop and MacDonald, 1971; Prociuk and Lussier, 1975; Thornhill, 
Thornhill, and Youngman, 1975) which reflect the growth of this 
research area. A number of reviews of the locus of control 
literature have also appeared (Minton, 1967; Lefcourt, 1966, 
1972; Rotter, 1966, 1975; Joe, 1971, and Phares, 1978), includ-
ing two books dealing exclusively with this topic (Lefcourt, 
1976; Phares, 1976). In light of this volume of research dealing 
with locus of control, there 'is a surprising paucity of well con-
trolled experimental investigations designed to examine the 
factors involved in the development and modification of locus of 
contrcl. Although the evidence is largely correlational or 
inferential in nature, two factors have emerged as salient in 
the development and modification of locus of control: personal 
control versusnopersonalcontrol and success versus failure. 
The purpose of the present investigation is to examine the 
effects of these factors in a controlled setting. 
Several investigators have studied the relationship between 
parental factors such as attitudes, child rearing practices, and 
styles of interacting with their children, with their children's 
locus of control scores (Chance, 1965; Katkovsky, Crandall, 
and Good, 1967; Tolor and Talowiec, 1968; Dav~s and Phares, 1969; 
Crandall, 1973). Taken together these studies point to warmth, 
nurturance, support, encouragement, flexibility, consistency, 
and pushing towards independence as being important parental 
factors involved in developing an internal orientation in the 
( J . ) 
child. These parents allow their children to experience their 
own influence over the environment and provide success experiences 
for the child's efforts through warmth and approval. Parental 
factors that have been found to relate to externality in the 
child such as hostility, rejection, punitiveness, and domination 
indicate that children with these types of parents are likely 
to be controlled by their parents and experience little success 
in terms of being rewarded with parental praise. 
Studies comparing locus of control scores of samples of 
differing culture, race, and social class also point to the im-
portance of these two factors in the development of locus of 
control orientation. Hsieh, Shybut, and Lotsof (1969) investi-
gated differences in Rotter's I-E scale scores between samples 
of Chinese, Chinese-American, and Anglo-American subjects. They 
hypothesized that the American culture with its emphasis·on 
uniqueness, independence, and self-reliance would produce 
individuals with a more internal orientation than the Chinese 
culture where kinship and status quo are stressed, and luck, 
chance, and fate are taken for granted in life. Their analysis 
of the data produced a mean of 8.58 for the Anglo-American group, 
9.79 for the American born Chinese, and 12.07 for a group of 
Hong Kong born Chinese. Both the Anglo-American and the Chinese-
American groups were significantly more internal than the 
native Chinese group. Battle and Rotter (1963) found that the 
lower class Black children in their study were significantly 
more external than both middle class Blacks and White subjects. 
Additionally, the middle class children in general were 
( 4 • ) 
significantly more internal than the lower class children. 
The more disadvantaged children i~ this study were also the 
ones that scored in a more external direction on locus of 
control. Battle and Rotter conclude that the perception of 
opportunity to obtain the material rewards in a culture seems 
------1 
to be an important part in developing an internal control 
orientation. Similar results were found by Lefcourt and Ladwig 
(1965) in a population of reformatory inmates. Blacks again 
scored significantly more external than White subjects. Lefcourt 
and Ladwig pointed to the role of segregation and discrimination 
in denying Blacks reinforcement despite their individual achieve-
ment efforts. This contention seems to be strengthened by 
Kiehlbauch's (1968) failure to find significant differences 
between Blacks and Whites on the Rotter I-E scale in a popula-
tion of reformatory inmates. Lefcourt (1976) maintains that 
since the major difference between these two studies is that 
the data were obtained approximately six years apart, the dif-
fering results may represent a real change brought about by the 
Civil Rights movement. 
Jessor, Graves, Hanson, and Jessor (1968) conducted an 
extensive field study in a tri-ethnic (Anglo, Indian, and 
Spanish-American) Southwestern rural community. The purpose 
of their study was to apply Rotter's social learning theory in 
a sociological investigation of deviant behavior. The oppor-
tunity subjects had to obtain culturally valued goals was 
studied through the use of an objective access to opportunity 
index which consisted of a series of eight measurements: age, 
marital status, language spoken in the home, occupation, 
( 5. ) 
education, religion, generation mobility, and social partici-
pation. In their community survey study of 221 persons it was 
found that Anglo's {X = 6.0) had a significantly greater access 
to opportunity than both Indians (X = 3.B) and Spanish-Americans 
(X = 3.4). This same order appeared for the three groups on a 
modified form of Rotter's I-E scale, with both Anglos {X = 6.0) 
and Indians (X = 7.0) significantly more internal than the 
Spanish-Americans {X = 10.1). Of more importance though, was 
the finding that objective access and locus of control were 
correlated {r = .50, p<.001) indicating that the more ability 
to attain valued goals and successfully influence one's environ-
ment that an individual has, the more personal control he per-
ceives himself to have. 
A wide variety of therapy and training studies have 
demonstrated pre to post-treatment shifts in locus of control 
toward a more internal orientation. Although the facLors 
bringing about change in these studies arc nebulous, the results 
suggest that as a person experiences some success at more ef fec-
tive ways of dealing with his life situation through therapy 
or training, it is reflected in a shift towards greater in-
ternality on locus of control measures. Smith (1970), assuming 
that patients seeking crisis intervention would be experiencing 
an overwhelming degree of pressure from external forces in their 
lives, predicted and found a significant shift in the internal 
direction after a six week crisis intervention treatment program. 
Non-crisis patients did not evidence a similar shift. Dua {1970) 
used subjects who expressed a concern about their ability to 
( 6.) 
interact and relate in interpersonal situations in a study 
which employed an eight week program of either behaviorally 
oriented action treatment or psychotherapy re-education. 
Although both groups showed a significant shift in an internal 
direction as compared to a control group, the behaviorally 
oriented action program resulted in a significantly greater 
shift than the psychotherapy re-education program. The action 
program procedures were designed to create new behaviors for 
dealing with situations where interpersonal anxiety is ·aroused, 
thus giving these subjects more effective methods of attaining 
personal control over their problems through their own actions. 
A study by Gillis and Jessor (1970) goes one step further and 
suggests that a shift towards a more internal locus of control 
may be a necessary condition for improvement in therapy to 
occur. After ten weeks of therapy, the therapy group shifted 
slightly towards a more internal orientation and the no-therapy 
group slightly towards a more external orientation, neither 
change being significant. However, when the subjects rated as 
improved by their therapists were analysed separately, this 
group showed a significant change in the internal direction. 
Pierce, Schauble, and Farkas (1970) found that they could 
successfully teach internalization behavior to clients within 
one therapy session. During the middle twenty minutes of a 
sixty minute session the therapist made the client directly 
aware of when he was internalizing or externalizing and gave 
positive verbal reinforcement for internalizing behavior. 
Recorded excerpts were taken from the first and last twenty 
( 7. ) 
minutes of the session during which time the therapist primarily 
engaged the client with interchangeable reflections. A compari-
son of the judges ratings of these excerpts revealed a signif i-
cant shift towards internalization behavior from first to the 
last twenty minutes of the therapy session. Lcsyk (1969) pre-
dicted that persons placed in a highly responsive milieu would 
increase in their belief in personal control of reinforcement. 
Lesyk tested the effect of a token economy, operant condition-
ing ward on the behavior of a group of female schizophrenic 
patients. The results indicated a significant shift toward a 
more internal orientation as measured by the Bialer-Cromwcll 
Locus of Control Scale (Bialer, 1961) between the two time 
samples studied (weeks 2 to 5 and weeks 12 to 15). Other 
therapy studies which have demonstrated a shift towards greater 
internal control include Diamond and Shapiro (1973) with 
encounter groups, Foulds (1971) with personal growth groups, 
Logan, et. al. (1977) with a values clarification program, 
Remainis (1974) with behavior modification for early graders 
and special counseling efforts to strengthen verbalization of 
internality for college students, and Felton and Biggs (1972) 
with Gestalt style group psychotherapy for collegiate low 
achievers. 
Studies employing training programs or structured exper-
iences have demonstrated shifts in locus of control orientation 
similar to the therapy studies. DcCharms (1972) has studied a 
concept which he terms Origin-Pawn that is very similar to the 
internal-external dimension of locus of control. Origin behavior 
refers to the initiation of intentional behavior by the person 
( 8.) 
and Pawn behavior refers to that which is impelled from forces 
outside the person. Thus the lo6us of causality for Origin 
behavior is within the person and the person is intrinsically 
motivated, while an outside source is the locus of causality 
for Pawn behavior and the person is extrinsically motivated. 
DeCharms developed a program which emphasized setting realistic 
goals, concrete goal directed behavior, evaluation of progress, 
and awareness of one's strengths and weaknesses. The Origin-
Pawn variable was measured by a content analysis of thought 
samples. In the elementary school classes studied, DeCharms 
found that the experimental groups which received the special 
training increased significantly in Origin behavior while the 
control group did not. 
Several other studies have demonstrated similar shifts 
using locus of control measures as the dependent variable. 
Wicker and Tyler (1975) devised instructional games and exer-
cises to help children understand the consequences of inap-
propriate social behavior. The subjects were educable mentally 
retarded children. After the twelve week study period the 
experimental group was significantly more internal than the 
control group on both the Children's Locus of Control Scale 
(Bialer, 1961) and the Intellectual Achievement Questionnaire 
(Crandall, et. al., 1965). The groups did not differ signifi-
cantly on the pre-tests. Felton (1973) found a significant 
shift in the internal direction for a group of middle level 
mental health workers after an 11 month training program. The 
subjects had participated in intensive group counselling 
sessions which emphasized internalization and actuation of 
( 9.) 
responsible behavior. 
An important study by Nowicki and Barnes (1973) investi-
gated the effects of a structured camp experience on the locus 
of control orientation of deprived inner-city adolescent campers. 
Seven groups of campers were tested prior to and at the conclu-
sion of the week long camping session on the Nowicki-Strickland 
Locus of Control Scale (Nowicki and Strickland, 1973). In 
addition, a selected group of campers were asked to return for 
an additional week and again tested at the conclusion of this 
week. The camp experience emphasized helping the campers to 
feel more in control of events and to better understand the 
contingency between their behavior and reinforcements. An 
overall comparison of the groups revealed a shift toward a more 
internal orientation. In addition, the group that returned for 
an extra week continued to shift toward a more internal direc-
tion. The importance of the Nowicki and Barnes study lies in 
the fact that a personal experience of control over reinforce-
ments evidently led to an increase in internality as measured 
by a generalized locus of control scale. 
An interesting proposal for a method of modifying locus of 
control orientation has been proposed by Chandler (1975). 
Chandler's strategy involves a peer teaching peer, where an 
externally oriented, low achieving child would function as the 
tutor. Chandler believes that the experience and perception of 
personal control over another child would help to bring about a 
more internal orientation in the tutor. Chandler tested this 
idea in a pilot study which used underachieving junior high 
school students who scored high on the Children's Locus of 
Control Scale (Bailer, 1961) as tutors to underachieving 
second and third graders. The analysis revealed a significant 
shift in the internal direction for the tutors. Although no 
control group was used in this study and results must be 
interpreted with some caution, it docs add weight to the argu-
ment that personal control in a situation may be an important 
factor in developing an internal control orientation. 
dU. j 
Pehazur and Wheeler (1971) de~onstrated that a very simple 
procedure may bring about a shift in control orientation as 
measured by the Children's Locus of Control Scale. They had 
administered this measure to a group of children while studying 
class differences in control orientation and need achievement. 
Three months later the minority children were given a short 
paragraph to read as part of a reading eY.ercisc. The stories 
depicted a boy getting into trouble: for odd rows of children 
in the class the stories emphasized external reasons for the 
boy getting into trouble, while internal reasons were emphasized 
in the stories read by children in the even rows. Following 
this, the locus of control measure was again administered. 
The group reading the external control story did not change 
in control orientation, but the group reading the internal 
control paragraph shifted significantly to~ard a more internal 
orientation. 
The effects of experience and success in occup~tional 
settings on locus of control orientation has also been docu~entcd 
in the literature. Harvey (1971) asked 50 upper level government 
administrators to take the Rotter I-E scale. He found that 
internality increased significantly with number of years in 
the position. Harvey suggested that possible factors which 
( 11.) 
may be involved in this trend could include "considerable 
practice in decision making and problem solving, the oppor-
tunity to observe the results of their decisions, and a general 
feeling of personal importance derived from an aura of respect 
and a oelief that their tasks are of significance to others 
(p. 982}~" Gottesfield and Dozier (1966) similarly found that 
experienced trainees who had been involved in a community action 
program for nine months were significantly more internal than a 
group of new recruits matched for age, sex, education and 
ethnic background. Martin and Shepel (1974) demonstrated that 
even a brief work skills training program could bring about 
modification in locus of control orientation. After an eighteen 
hour training program in counselling skills a group of 21 senio: 
nurses shifted significantly toward a more internal locus of 
control. 
Andrisani and Nestel (1976) provide evidence that points 
to successful work experience as being important to the 
development and stability of an internal locus of control. 
Using 2,972 respondents from the National Longitudinal Survey's 
representative sample of middle aged male5lthese authors made 
an extensive investigation of the relationshi~ between scores 
on a modified Rotter I-E scale and factors involved in the 
world of work. Their study was both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal in nature. Correlational coefficients between 
l 
( l 2.) 
1969 and 1971 for scores on the I-E scale were only .55 for 
Whites and .35 for Blacks. The authors note that these arc in 
marked contrast to the internal consistency reliability 
estimates of .75 that had been previously reported. Andrisani 
and Nestel further note that "the data suggest that I-E 
expectancies not only change over time, even for middle aged 
men, but that the change is in response to changing experience 
at the work place. In particular, there is evidence that 
advancement in occupational status, advancc~cnt in annual 
earnings, and reentry into the labor force arc systc~atically 
related to increasing internal control (pp. 161-162) ." Thc~c 
occupational studies provide support for the contention that 
personal control in the sense of experienced ~astcry of one's 
work environment and success arc important contributors to 
an internal locus of control. 
Several studies investigating the devclopr.ental aspects 
of locus of control emphasize the importance of felt mastery 
over the environment as being significant to the dcvclop~cnt 
of an internal control orientation. Bialcr (1961), using both 
normal and mentally retarded children as subjects, found that 
there was a significant tendency among all subjects, regardless 
of the normal-mentally retarded classification, to be ~ore 
internal on the Childrens' Locus of Control Scale with increasing 
age. In addition, Bialer found Hcntal Age to be a r..ore rele-
vant variable than chronological age. In fact, chronologi-
cal age was found to carry no significant weight when the 
effects of mental age were partiallcd out. In a si=ilar study, 
Penk (1969) tested five groups of children, ranging in age 
(13.) 
from seven to eleven years old, on the Chilcrens' Locus of 
Control Scale. His findings revealed an increase in internality 
with increasing age. The pattern of correlations of locus of 
control score with chronological age and Peabody Picture Test 
mental ages led Penk to conclude that children employing more 
mature verbal abstractions also tended to be more internal. 
Lao (1974) gave a Personal Data Questionnaire and the Rotter 
I-E scale to subjects in seven age groups from fifteen to 
eighty-five years of age. An increasing internal locus of 
control orientation from fifteen to thirty-nine years of age 
accompanied a reported increased sense of mastery and control 
over the environment, while a stabilized locus of control 
accompanied the more stabilized life style of that period 
after age 39. 
Three further studies, two serendipitous in nature, 
highlight the way personal experiences of control or no control 
may effect locus of control orientation. Gorman (1968) just 
happened to give the Rotter I-E scale to a group of college 
students the day after the 1968 Democratic National Convention. 
These students, most of whom were McCarthy supporters, scored 
significantly more external than previously reported means for 
college students. Gorman suggests that the experienced dis-
appointment of these students may have been a factor in these 
findings. In a similar chance finding, McArthur (1970) 
administered the Rotter I-E scale to a group of Yale under-
graduates on the day after the draft lottery. Students who 
were old enough to be effected by the lottery were significantly 
more external than a similar group of students tested before 
,---------
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the lottery (p(.10). When .McArthur separated the external 
group into those who were favorably effected by the lottery 
and those who were not, he found that the former were signif i-
cantly more external than the latter (p<.05), and largely 
accounted for the greater externality in the experimental group 
as compared to the control group. .McArthur's concluding 
remarks suggest the relevance of luck in these findings. Prior 
to the lottery all subjects could reasonably have expected to 
be drafted upon graduation unless they could secure some sort 
of deferment. After the lottery then, only those subjects 
favorably effected experienced a real change in draft status. 
Because of their high numbers in the draft these subjects 
could reasonably expect not to be drafted. McArthur maintains 
that these subjects clearly experienced a stroke of good luck, 
while the lottery did not as clearly bring bad luck to those 
not favorably effected since their position in regard to the 
draft remained relatively the same. Lefcourt (1972) reports 
an unpublished study by Kiehlbauch (1968) which presents 
similar data in that personal experiences of personal control 
and no control appeared to significantly effect locus of 
control orientation. Kiehlbauch found greater externality 
upon admission and just prior to release as compared to the 
interim period of their incarceration for a group of reforma-
tory inmates. Lefcourt suggests that this finding may relate 
to the uncertainty and helplessness in terms of coping 
experienced at the time of admission and release compared to 
the stability and opportunity for successful coping behavior 
during the intermediate period. 
(15.) 
A series of studies "dealing with changes in expectancy 
for future success have demonstrated that subjects respond 
differentially under skill and chance situations. Phares 
(1957) investigated subjects expectancies for future rein-
forcement in two task situations: matching colors and match-
ing lengths of lines. Phares manipulated chance and skill 
conditions through differential instructions, half of the sub-
jects were led to believe that skill was involved in making 
these discriminations, while the other half of the subjects 
were led to believe that the discriminations were so hard that 
success was largely a matter of guesswork. All subjects 
received an equal number of reinforcements. In spite of this, 
subjects under chance instructions made smaller and less frequent 
expectancy changes in relation to reinforcement feedback than 
did subjects under skill conditions. In essence, subjects 
given skill instructions responded more in line with environ-
mental cues than did subjects given chance instructions. Two 
further studies, one using differential instructions to manipu-
late skill and chance situations (James and Rotter, 1958) and 
the other using two different tasks for the same purpose (Rotter, 
Liverant, and Crowne, 1961) ,report similar results. The major 
finding in these studies was that the typical partial reinforce-
ment effect of being more resistant to extinction than 100% 
reinforcement was. true only for subjects given chance instruc-
tions. For subjects given skill instructions, 100% reinforcement 
was more resistant to extinction than 50% reinforcement. In 
other words, perceived personal control had a strong effect 
upon the subject's continuing to respond after extinction was 
(lG.) 
initiated. Since task specific expectancies for control of 
reinforcements were evidently effected differentially by 
personal control as manipulated by skill and chance situations 
in these studies, a logical extension of this finding is the 
possibility that the more generalized control expectancies as 
measured by locus of control scales might also be similarly 
effected. 
A number of studies have explored the effects of success 
and failure on post-task attributions of causality. Although 
the post-task measures of attribution are not locus of control 
measures in a strict sense, they do provide a task specific 
measure of control orientation. These studies then, are rele-
vant to the effects of success versus failure in the same way 
the expectancy level studies were relevant to personal control 
(skill) versus no personal control (chance) effects. That is, 
if success and failure have significant differential effects 
on post-task attributions of causality, then it is a reason-
able possibility that similar effects might be reflected in a 
post-task measure of locus of control. 
Streufert and Streufert (1969) studied decision making with 
pairs of subjects. The results relevant to the present study 
showed that the dyads took increasingly more credit for success 
as success increased, but did not take more responsibility 
for failure as it was increased. In a simila~ study, Sobel 
(1974) examined the effects of success and failure on an 
anagrams task with subjects classified as either internals or 
externals based on Rotter's (1966) norms. The analysis 
revealed that success on the task resulted in attribution to 
{l 7.) 
internal factors (intelligence, ability to concentrate and 
think quickly, skill in problem solving) while failure produced 
attribution to external factors (item difficulty, amount of 
time allotted, features of the work environment, and time of 
day) . Sobel found the moderating variables of personality 
to be weak (internal versus external). Johnson, Feigenbaum, 
and Weiby (1964) had their subjects teach arithmetic via a 
microphone to two fictitious students they thought were in tl1e 
next room. The subjects were then told that sudent A had done 
very well and student B poorly. The subjects were asked to 
teach an additional arithmetic lesson and student D either 
continued to do poorly or improved after this lesson. The 
subjects for whom student B continued to do poorly attributed 
the reasons to the student (external factors) while the subjects 
for whom student B improved attributed it to an improved 
teaching presentation on their part (internal factors). 
A study by Eisenman (1972) provides evidence that personal 
control has a clear effect on locus of control. Eisenman 
directly examined the effects of personal control determined 
by skill and chance instructions on subjects rc!;por:sc~ to the 
Rotter I-E scale. The subjects in this study were 150 college 
students. one hundred of these subjects participated in three 
verbal conditioning experiments in which they had to decide 
which pronoun another student had used to begin each of 30 
sentences. Fifty of these subjects were instructed that their 
"clinical sensitivity" could lead to excellent guesses as to 
the correct pronoun, while the other fifty were told that 
( l H. ) 
correct guessing would be of a random nature. The former 
instructions were designed to emphasize the person's internal 
skills as being important in determining the results, while the 
latter instructions were designed to suggest that performance 
results were beyond the subjects control. A third group of 
50 subjects, used as control, wrote stories to Thematic Apperccp-
tion Test cards on three different occasions. The subjects 
were tested on a pre and post basis with the Rotter I-E scale. 
There were no significant differences among the three groups on 
the pre-test. On the post-test, the group taking part in the 
experiments emphasizing internal skills showed a significant 
change in the internal direction (-2.50). The group taking 
part in the experiments emphasizing random guessing showed a 
significant change in the external direction {+2.10). Tl1c 
control group did not change significantly (+.75). Eisen~an 
states that "the present findings suggest that experience in 
situations which the subject believes reflect his own control 
over events can increase the likelihood of his believing that 
he has control over reinforcements. Likewise, repeated 
experience in situations where the subject feels he has no 
control can diminish his feelings of being able to control 
his environment (p. 435)". 
A study by Epstein and Ko~orita (1971) provides clear 
evidence concerning the effects of success and failure on 
subjects' responses to locus of control ~casurcs. These 
investigators developed a fourteen ite~ locus of control scale 
with reworded items from the Children's Locus of Control Scale 
and Battle and Rotter's (196]) Children's Picture Test of 
Internal-External control. The subjects took part in a line 
( 19.) 
matching task and were given falsified success-failure feedback . 
. 
The subjects, 120 Black children, were asked then to answer the 
locus of control measure in direct relation to the task situa-
tion. The results revealed a significant difference in 
scores on the locus of control measure between subjects experi-
encing success (X = 28.93) and subjects experiencing failure 
(X = 30.90), with success producing scores in a more internal 
direction. Although pre and post measures were not taken in 
this study, and only inferences can be made concerning the 
modification of locus of control, the results do clearly 
suggest the significance of success and failure as having 
effects on locus of control. Epstein and Komorita attempted 
to assess change in locus of control by using the same subjects 
in a similar task situation one week later. The subjects were 
again given falsified success-failure feedback producing four 
treatment groups (success-success, success-failure, failure-
failure, and failure-success). The same locus of control 
measure was administered after the task situation along with 
several other tests. Unfortunately, during the second task 
and testing situation, the subjects manifested fatigue, 
restlessness, and loss of interest. The experimenters questioned 
the reliability of this data and for that reason did not report 
it. 
Brecher and Denmark (1972), with a serendipitous finding, 
provide evidence that no personal control and failure feedback 
have an effect on locus of control orientation. These investi-
gators had given the Rotter I-E scale to three classes, con-
sisting of 88 female undergraduates at Hunter College, within 
( 2 0.) 
a one week time span. One of the classes had taken an examina-
tion and were due to receive their grades on the day of the 
testing. When the authors learned of this they decided to 
take advantage of the situation. Immediately preceeding the 
administration of the I-E scale the instructor of this class 
told these 22 subjects that she would not be returning their 
exam papers as promised. She then told them that it was the 
worst set of papers she had ever seen and that over half the 
class had failed, with the rest doing poorly. She further 
added that she was very disappointed and would not discuss 
the matter any further .. The instructor then briefly introduced 
the experimenter and then left. The results indicate that 
these subjects scored significantly more external (X = 13.0) 
on the Rotter I-E scale than the subjects in the other two 
classes (10.41). Brecher and Denmark conclude that subjects 
"given negative feedback concerning examination results with 
no apparent recourse (opportunity to see or discuss results) 
appeared significantly more external than the control groups 
(p. 462) ." 
A thorough review of the literature on the development 
and modification of locus of control led Allin (1978) to 
posit personal control (skill instructions) versus no personal 
control (chance instructions) and success versus failure as 
critical factors in the modification of locus of control. 
He hypothesized that taking part in a skill task would result 
in a shift in locus of control orientation in an internal 
direction while participation in a chance task would result 
in greater externality. He also predicted that success feedback 
( 21.) 
would produce a shift in the internal direction and failure 
. 
feedback a shift in the external direction. In a design unique 
to the locus of control literature, Allin tested these hypo-
theses by taking pre and post-task measurements of locus of 
control using a slightly modified version of the Rotter I-E 
scale. Allin described the personalities of three fictitious 
persons and -informed the subjects that these persons had 
previously taken a word association test. The task of Allin's 
subjects was to try to respond to the ten word association 
items with the same words as the persons described. Personal 
control and no personal control conditions were manipulated 
by skill and chance instructions, respectively. The skill 
instructions emphasized the logical connection between the 
words and the importance of the subject's clinical sensitivity 
in making the correct responses. The chance instructions 
emphasized luck and the lack of control on the subject's 
part in determining the correct responses. The success-
failure conditions were manipulated by providing falsified 
feedback. The design also included a no feedback condition 
and a control group which received ambiguous (no skill or 
chance bias ) instructions and no feedback. 
The results of Allin 1 s analysis yielded a significant 
three-way interaction (task in~tructions X type of feedback 
X trials) and- a significant two-way interaction under the 
succes~ condition (task instructions X trials). A further 
breakdown of the data- failed to yield any significant results. 
Thus no conclusions can be drawn from these results concerning 
the main effects of the independent variables. In concluding 
(22.) 
Allin also states that "based on the results of this investiga-
tion it is evident that further research is necessary in order 
to draw conclusions about the nature of tl1e interaction (p. 42)". 
It is the contention of the present study that the ambigu-
ity of Allin's results may have been due primarily to his use 
of the Rotter I-E scale as the measure of locus of control. 
The Rotter I-E scale has been criticized primarily with respect 
to the following three issues: 1. generalization across 
persons and reinforcement areas; 2. agents of external con-
trol; 3. types of reinforcement-positive versus negative 
{Crandall, et. al., 1965; Lefcourt, 1976). It is possible that 
the defects in the Rotter I-E scale with respect to any of 
these three issues could have contributed to obscuring Allin's 
results. For this reason each of these issues will be discus-
sed separately. 
Gurin, Gurin, Lao, and Beattie (1969) were the first to 
criticize the Rotter I-E scale in terms of being too general 
in nature. Gurin, et. al., examined the responses of a group 
of Southern Black college students to the Rotter I-E scale and 
other personal and racially oriented items. Factor analysis 
of these items revealed two distinct factors, one dealing 
with reinforcement contingencies for the particular person 
(personal control), and the other dealing with contingencies 
for the culture at large (control ideology). The personal 
control items on the Rotter I-E scale (sec appendix A) , all 
of which are phrased in the first person include, 13, 9, 28, 
and 25 in order of their loadings. The control ideology items, 
( 2 J. ) 
only one of which is worded explicitly in the first person, 
include 16, 11, 6, 23, 7, 10, 26, 20, and 18 in order of 
their loading. Gurin, ct. al., studied the rclationsllips 
between three control scores (personal control, control ideology, 
and total score) and a variety of motivational and performance 
measures. From their results Gurin, ct. al., concluded that 
only rarely do personal control and control ideology operate 
the same way, it usually being personal control that relates 
to measures of motivation and performance, i.e., high internal 
personal control leads to high motivation and performance. 
These investigators also found, however, that it was externality 
on the control ideology factor that related to willingness to 
get involved with social action and the choosing of atypical 
careers for Blacks. Sanger and Alker (1972) reported a Gimilar 
personal control versus control ideology factor structure in 
a college age srunplc of feminists and non activist controls. 
Joe (1974) found that attributions of causality were related 
to personal control scores but showed little rclation~hip to 
control ideology scores. On an ambiguous task, high personal 
control as compared to low personal control subjects pcrc~ived 
that successful outcomes were determined by skill rather than 
chance, exhibited a lower tendency to attribute causality to 
physical surroundings and experimental factors for task failures, 
and indicated that they tried harder on successful than on 
failure outcomes. It is possible that Allin's subjects 
chanyed differ~ntially on these two factors, with the personal 
( 2 4. ) 
control factor being more likely to reflect changes as a result 
of personal control versus no personal control and success-
failure feedback mctnipulations. 
Lao (1970), extending the research of Gurin, et. al. 
(1969), found similar results, that i~an internal belief in 
personal control was positively related to measures of academic 
competence and an external belief in control ideology was 
positively related to innovative,' behavior for Black college 
students. Lao concluded that, "the personal and ideological 
variables are not only independent in a correlational sense 
(r = .124), bµt they are also independent in the sense that 
neither effects how the other operates (p. 270) . 11 Lao also 
raised questions as to the development of these two expectancies 
and suggested that the socialization of the two may differ in 
many ways. 
While the preceeding studies question the reliability 
of the Rotter I-E scale in terms of its generality across 
persons (who's control is being referred to), Mirels (1970) 
and others have found two factors which differentiate in terms 
of reinforcement areas. Mirels' two factors were a belief 
.concerning felt masteryover one's life (items 25, 11, 15, 16, 
23, 18, 28, 5, 10) and a belief concerning the extent to which 
the individual citizen is deemed capable of exerting an impact 
on political institutions (items 17~ 22, 12, 29). Several 
other investigators have found similar factors (John and Jahn, 
1973; Abrahamson, Schludermann, and Schludermann, 1973; 
Viney, 1974; Cherlin and Bourque, 1974). 
(25.) 
Abramowitz (1973) and O'Leary,et.al. (1975) have offered empirical 
support for Mirels' two factors. Abramowitz found that political 
commitment in a group of college students was effectively 
predicted by scores on the political factor, but not by scores 
on the nonpolitical items or by the whole scale. O'Leary found 
a significant shift toward internality in a group of alchoholics 
after treatment. When he examined these results in terms of 
Mirels' two factors, he found that there was a similar signifi-
cant shift in the personal but not in the sociopolitical items. 
Other researchers have found additional factors. Collins 
(et. al., 1973; 1974) separated the 23 forced choice items of 
the Rotter I-E scale into 46 Likert scale items and found four 
factors which he labeled difficulty of world, unjust world, 
predictability-luck, and political responsiveness. Reid and 
Ware(l973) originally found. two factors similar to Mirels 
which they called fatalism and social system control. In a 
later study (Reid and Ware, 1974) they added items which dealt 
.with self control of impulses, desires, and emotion and found 
that this added an important third factor not represented in 
the Rotter I-E scale. 
The evidence presented in this discussion points to the 
importance of examining locus of control factors separately 
when using scores on a locus of control measure as the dependent 
variable, since variance on one factor could obscure variance 
on the other factor. Allin attempted to deal with this issue 
by omitting the politically oriented items from the Rotter I-E 
scale (3, 12, 17, 22, 29). It would have been interesting to 
compare changes in control orientations aG assessed by thesP 
( 2(i.) 
two factors had Allin included these items. Allin's method 
of controlling for generality in ·the Rotter I-E scale can be 
criticized on two counts. First, omitting items may have 
implications in terms of the reliability of the scale, and 
secondly Allin's choice of items to omit did not take into 
consideration the other factors which have been found, most 
notably those of Gurin, et. al, and Collins. A more effective 
method of dealing with the issue of generalization might be 
to use a more specific locus of control measure. 
The results which Allin obtained on a skill-chance rating 
scale employed on a pre and post-task basis in the same study 
clearly point in this direction. The personal control group 
initially rated the task as involving skill. After receiving 
feedback those subjects who failed changed significantly 
toward a more chance rating while those receiving success 
feedback did not change significantly in their ratings. On the 
other hand, subjects in the no personal control group initially 
rated the task as one involving chance. Of these subjects 
only those receiving success feedback significantly changed 
their ratings, this being in the direction of indicating that 
more skill was involved. Allin argues "that this measure of 
control orientation, although initially biased by task instruc-
tions does have the advantage of being more situation-specific 
and subjective than such a measure as the Rotter I-E scale 
{pp. 52-53)." 
Other researchers have found success using more specific 
measures of locus of control. Neuman (1977), studying risk 
used a final decision made by the subjects as a specific locus 
of control measure. The results indicated that internals were 
significantly more risky than externals when the specific 
locus of control measure was used to classify subjects. 
When the Rotter I-E Scale was used to classify subjects, 
( 2 7. ) 
similar trends were noted, but the results were not signif-
icant. 
Bradley (1977) developed a scale to measure specific 
control expectancies in three achievement domains (intellec-
tual, social, and physical). The Locus of Control Inventory 
for Three Achievement Domains (LOCITAD) contains 48 items to be 
answered yes or no, with half the items in each domain measur-
ing control orientation for successful outcomes and half for 
unsuccessful outcomes.· Bradley and Webb (1976) predicted an 
increase in perceived control from adolescence to middle 
adulthood followed by a decline in old age for the physical and 
social subscales and a relatively stable control orientation 
for the intellect~al subscale. They believed that locus of 
control scores on these subscales would reflect the rise in 
physical and social abilities that adulthood brings, followed 
by the decline in physical abilities and loss of power and 
productivity in social situations which accompanies old age. 
They also maintained that the relative stability of mental 
functioning across the age span tested would be reflected in 
the stable intellectual subscale scores. Four age categories 
were included in the study: 13 - 18, 19 - 25, 35 - 50, and 
60 ~ 90. In general, the results supported the hypotheses. 
Adults over 60 scored significantly more external than 
individuals from the three .other age groups on the physical 
( 2 8. ) 
subscale, adolescents and persons over 60 scored significantly 
more external than did the 35 - 50 age group on the social 
subscale, and no reliable age differences were noted on the 
intellectual subscale. Bradley and Gaa (1977) demonstrated 
that an experimental manipulation could modify control 
orientation in one domain while not in others. A group of 
students participated in five weekly goal setting conferences 
designed to increase internality with regard to academic 
achievement. The results indicated that these students were 
significantly more internal on the intellectual subscale of 
LOCITAD and the Intellectual Achievement Responsibility 
Questionnaire after the five conferences as compared to two 
control groups. No significant differences were found on 
the social and physical subscale of LOCITAD. 
McKee (1976) has also developed a scale to differentiate 
specific domains of expectancy for contr9l which he calls the 
Multidimensional Expectancy Control Scale. This measure con-
tains subscales to assess locus of control in the political, 
academic, and interpersonal realms. Little work has been done 
with this scale, but McKee did find that the academic subscale 
scores (internal control) correlated significantly with 
cumulative grade point averages in a positive direction, 
while a similar correlation using scores on the Rotter I-E scale 
did not reach significance. 
Kirscht (1972) compared a general locus of control measure 
with a measure specific to health belief in terms of their 
accuracy in predicting health related activities. He found 
( 2 9. ) 
the general scale to be a better predictor of reported vul-
nerability and belief in the efficacy of preventive action, 
while the health control measure was a better predictor of 
action taken in health related activities. A low correlation 
(0.29) was found between these two scales. In a follow up 
study reported in the same article Kirscht found more consis-
tency between the general and heaith specific scales. In 
this study, however, he differentiated between expectancy 
and motivation items, which other researchers have not done, 
making the results difficult to interpret. 
A study by Wallston, Wallston, Kaplan, and Maides (1976) 
in·the area of h~alth cbntrol expectancies provides a clearer 
picture. They developed an 11-item Likert scale designed as 
a measure of control expectancy specific to health related 
behavior. It was predicted in this study that subjects who 
held an internal control expectancy and highly valued health 
would choose to expose themselves to more health related 
information than internal persons who valued health less or 
than externals, regardless of the value they placed on health. 
This prediction was confirmed with the use of the Health Locus 
of Control Scale but not with the Rotter I-E scale. It was 
also found that subjects were more satisfied with a weight 
reduction program that was consistent with their locus of 
control orientation than one that was not, i.e., internally 
oriented with a self directed program and externally oriented 
with a group program. Again these results were significant 
when the Health Locus of Control Scale was used but not when 
( 3 0. ) 
the Rotter I-E scale was used. The results with regard to 
weight actually lost were consistent with the hypothesis, 
though not significant, with the Health Locus of Co~trol Scale, 
but in the direction opposite to prediction when the Rotter 
I-E scale was used. 
Lewis, Cheney~ and Dawes (1977), using the Rotter I-E 
scale as a model, developed a 19-item forced choice scale to 
specifically assess the amount of control experienced in 
interpersonal interactions. In two studies reported by 
Cheney, et. al., the Locus of Control of Interpersonal Relation-
ships Questionnaire correlated significantly with the rated 
job effectiveness of camp counselors, while the Rotter I-E scale 
did not. 
In general, then, the trend in locus of control research 
seems to be toward the use of more specific measures rather 
than the more generalized scales such as the Rotter I-E. These 
scales have been demonstrated to be more effective than the 
multidimensional Rotter I-E scale, especially when examin-
ing relationships in particular situations or areas of 
concern. 
The second major criticism of the Rotter I-E scale 
deals with agents of external control. The Rotter I-E scale 
includes a variety of sources of external control which have 
not been demonstrated to be synonomous with each other. Hersch 
and Schiebe (1967), for instance, found that on the Adjective 
Check List, 23 adjectives were checked significantly more 
often by individuals· classified as internals, presenting a 
( 31.) 
fairly coherent picture (clever, efficient, egotistical, 
enthusiastic, independent, self-confident, ambitious, asser-
tive, boastful, conceited, conscientious, deliberate, per-
servering, clear-thinking, dependable, determined, reasonable, 
and stubborn). Only one adjective, however, was checked 
significantly more often by subjects classified as externals, 
this being "self-pitying". Hersch and Scheibe conclude 
that there may be a diversity in the psychological meaning 
of externality with a person evidencing external control for 
a wide variety of reasons, including: "l. being realistically 
or physically weak; 2. being in a highly competitive situa-
tion where the actions of others have a significant effect on 
his chances for success; 3. a belief in luck or fate; 4. 
may develop feelings of persecution with or without reason 
(pp. 612-613) " 
Levenson (1973a, 1974) has developed a scale which dif-
ferentiates between agents of external control. The scale 
consists of 24 items presented in Likert format. Three sub-
scalPs of eight items each measure "internality", "control by 
powerful others", and "control by chance". Factor rinalysis 
revealed that the scales are conceptually independent with 
little overlap. In a study using normal and psychiatric 
subjects, Levenson (1973a) found that the scale made interesting 
discriminations. Patients and normal subjects 'did not differ 
on the internality scale, but the psychiatric patients were 
significantly more external on the powerful others and chance 
scales. Psychotics scored significantly more external than 
( J). • ) 
neurotics on the powerful others and chance scales. For 
patients who were in the hospital· 60 days or more, paranoids 
scored significantly more external on the powerful others 
scale than did patients diagnosed schizophrenic undifferentiated. 
Committed patients were significantly more external on the 
control by powerful others scale than voluntary patients. In 
a later study, Levenson (1974) found that, as predicted, only 
a belief in chance was differentially related to involvement 
and knowledge in antipollution activities. Levenson theorized 
that belief in control by powerful others and low expectancies 
for self control do not diminish activity since the potential 
for control is still present, while for the person with a 
high belief in chance there is no hope for control. Male 
subjects who believed less in the operation of chance factors 
were more likely to be involved in antipollution activities. 
Also, among those who were members of an antipollution 
group, those who were high on the chance scale were less 
knowledgeable about pollution. Similar results were not found 
among the female subjects. Levenson concludes that "although 
the control by powerful others scale and the chance scale were 
correlated with each other, they behaved very differently in 
their relationship to involvement and information. It appears 
that these orientations are tapping quite different beliefs and 
therefore should not Le grouped Logcther under the rubric of 
external control (p. 380)". 
Tiffany (1967, 1973) developed a scale which dirferenti-
ate~ four factors: 1. controlling forces such as gut level 
impulses experienced as coming from internal sources~ ~. 
self controlling mechanisms one perceives himself to have 
( 3 j. ) 
over internal forces; 3. social skills or abilities to 
manipulate the environment that one experiences himself as 
having; 4. the experience of social customs or pressures 
corning from environmental sources. Both Tiffany (1967) and 
O'Leary, et. al. (1976) have demonstrated the usefulness of this con-
ceptualization in evaluating treatment programs. 
The evidence concerning agents of external control again 
points to the possibility that differential responding to 
the various parameters of external control contained in the 
Rotter I-E scale may .obscure results when used as a measure 
for the dependent variable, as in the Allin study. 
The third major point of criticism of the Rotter I-E 
scale, the issue of types of reinforcement, is particularly 
relevant to Allin's study since type of feedback was one 
of the two independent variables. The Rotter I-E scale not 
only does not discriminate between control expectancies for 
successful and failure outcomes, but, as Sobel (1974) points 
out, is biased in the failure direction. Sobel found that 
scores on the Rotter I-E scale correlated with attribution 
to internal and external factors only in the failure condition. 
He suggested that this result may be due to the fact that of 
the 13 items that are explicitly oriented toward either 
positive or negative outcomes, ten involve negative outcomes. 
Sobel concludes that "if this explanation of the data is 
correct it should be possible to obtain the predicted correlations 
between locus of control andpost-perforrnance attribution over 
all conditions by developing a scale which balances the number 
( 3 4. ) 
of success and failure oriented items (p. 33) ". 
Crandall, Katkovsky, and Crandall (1965) developed the 
Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Questionnaire to 
measure both control expectancies for positive outcomes r+ 
subscale) and negative outcomes (I subscale) in addition to 
a general score for control orientation which is the sum of 
the two subscales. The validational study on the IAR presented 
evidence that supports the contention that control orientation 
for positive outcomes is different from control orientation 
for negative outcomes. Crandall, et. al., noting that the 
reliability coefficients for the I subscale were greater than 
+ - + those for the I subscale (I = .74, I = .66 for 47 third, 
fourth, and fifth grade children); (I + = .69, I = .47 for 
70 ninth graders) suggested that since previous studies have 
found negative social reinforcement to be more effective than 
positive reinforcement (Crandall, 1963; Crandall, Good and 
Crandall, 1964), "it may possibly be that the greater impact 
of punishment produces a more durable effect on the internal-
external responsibility beliefs surrounding these experiences 
(p. 101) ." In support of this reasoning, McGhee and Crandall 
(1968) found the I subscale to be a consistently better pre-
dictor of academic achievement. 
Crandall, et. al (1965) also found the correlations 
between the I- and I+ subscales to be generally low, which they 
maintained indicated the independence of the two subscales. 
The correlations between the subscales were especially low for 
children in the lower grades, which raises the possibility 
--·-------------------------
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that control orientations for positive outcomes may be 
developed.independent of control orientations for negative 
outcomes. 
Solomon, Houlihan, Busse, and Parelius (1971) observed 
parents helping their children in problem solving situations. 
They found that mothers who usually rejected or disagreed 
with their son's comments, had sons who scored low on the I+ 
subscale of the IAR, i.e., tended to be external in control 
orientation for positive outcome. Boys with mothers who usually 
accepted and agreed with them, tended to be more external on 
the I- subscale. This finding also suggests that control 
orientations for positive and negative outcomes may develop 
differentially. These authors interpret this finding by 
reasoning that, "if agreement/acceptance represents (or includes) 
positive reinforcement, it may be that boys who receive much 
of it come to expect that their achievement efforts will 
generally meet with approval and therefore assign unexpected 
negative reinforcements to external causes. By the same 
reasoning, boys who typically receive negative responses may 
come to believe that any positive reinforcements received ~ust 
not be due to their own efforts (p. 231) ." 
Mischel, Zeiss, and Zeiss (1974) developed the Stanford 
Preschool Internal-External Scale (SPIES) which, like the !AR, 
+ -
also provides I and I subscales in addition to a total I 
score. The SPIES consists of 14 forced choice (internal 
versus external) items, six describing a positive and eight a 
negative event, and is scored in an internal direction. Thus 
+ -the maximum scores for the I , I , and total I scales are 6, 
8, and 14, respectively. Normative data were presented for 
211 subjects (98 male and 113 female) from the Bing Nursery 
School of Stanford University. As was the case with the IAR, 
the I+ and I subscales of the SPIES were not related to each 
other. Correlations on the two subscales were .03, -.06, and 
-.02 for males, females, and the total sample respectively, 
none approaching significance. In three delay of gratifica-
+ -tion studies involving a positive reward, I but not I or 
total I was significantly correlated with relevant instru-
mental activity. In two studies in which responses to negative 
events were studied only I correlated. significantly with 
relevant instrumental activity. The authors concluded that 
"in spite of the small number of items within the I+ and I 
subscales, the significant correlations of each subscale with 
conceptually relevant behavioral measures were in all of the 
cases larger than those obtained from using the total I score. 
Thus, any advantage that the total I scale might have because 
it contains twice as many items as the subscales is more than 
offset by mixing together positive and negative outcomes (p. 277) ." 
DuCuette, Wolk, and Soucar (1972) compared maladjusted and 
normal children with respect to their IAR scores. They found 
that it was ''neither internality nor eiternality per se that 
is related to maladjustive behavior, but is instead the 
relationship between these two in regard to different kinds 
of events that is important (p. 294) ." While scores on the 
two subscales were relatively homogenious for normal children, 
there were important differences between scores on the two 
subscales from the maladjusted children. The results indicated 
(37.) 
that the White problem child and the high IQ problem chil.d 
scored high on the I + subscale and low on the I subscale, 
i.e., they assume a great deal of credit for their failures 
but very little for their successes. The opposite pattern 
was displayed by the Black problem child and the low IQ 
problem child. These children scored high on the I+ subscale 
and low on the I subscale, indicating that they tend to 
assume responsibility for their successes but not their fail-
ures. From this data it is evident that the use of a scale 
such as the Rotter I-E scale which does not discriminate 
between control orientation for positive and negative outcomes 
might mask important differences in control expectancies 
within the individual. 
Taken together, the studies which have been discussed 
concerning the issue of type of reinforcement seem to indicate 
that control orientation for positive outcomes is relatively 
independent of control orientation for negative outcomes, and 
that the two may develop differentially. If this is true, it 
is reasonable to assume that control orientation for positive 
and negative outcomes may also undergo differential modif ica-
tion with respect to the independent variables in Allin's 
study, especially the variable of type of feedback. For 
instance, a subject receiving success feedback might become 
more internal, in line with Allin's hypothesis, but only for 
positive outcomes, while changing little or not at all with 
respect to control orientation for negative outcomes. The 
converse might be expected for the subject receiving failure 
--------( .5.:..) 
feedback, that is; become more external with regard to 
negative outcomes but change little in control orientation 
for positive outcomes. This data concerning type of reinforce-
ment again points to Lhe possibility that Allin's use of the 
Rotter I-E scale, which does not discriminate between control 
orientations for positive and negative outcomes, may have 
obscured the results. 
To summarize, the Rotter I-E scale which was used in 
Allin's study, has been criticised for its multidimensionality 
with regard to three issues, generalization across persons 
and reinforcement areas, agents of ,external control, and types 
of feedback. The purpose of the present study was to provide 
a clearer picture of the operation of situational control and 
type of feedback in the modification of locus of control orien-
tation. The Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Question-
naire was designed to improve on the Rotter I-E scale with 
regard to the previously mentioned three issues by it's speci-
ficity to the academic achievement situation, limitation to 
significant others as agents of external control, and provi-
sion of separate subscales to measure control orientations 
for p~sitive and negative outcomes (Crandall et. al., 1965). 
For these reasons the IAR was used in the present investiga-
tion. In addition, a task specific measure of control orien-
tation developed by Epstein and Komorita (1971) was used for 
comparison with the IAR, in an attempt to better understand 
how control expectancies in a specific situation may generalize 
to a larger sphere. 
The following hypotheses were tested: Personal control 
in a skill situation will lead to an increase in internal 
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control while no personal control in a chance situation will 
lead to an increase in external control. In addition, it was 
predicted that success feedback would result in increased 
internal control and failure feedback in increased external 
control. No interaction effects were predicted due to the 
lack of sufficient previous research. 
It should also be noted that the Allin study did not 
control for sex factors. There has been some evidence that 
control orientations may develop differentially in the two 
sexes (Crandall, et. al., 1965), with different parental 
factors being more important for one sex than for the other 
(Katkovsky, Crandall, and Good, 1967). Also, internal control 
generaly relates to high achievement behavior for males but 
not for females (Crandall, et. al., 1965; Nowicki and Roundtree, 
1971; Boor, 1973). Several investigators have suggested a 
social desireability factor for females to explain this finding. 
McDonald and Tseng (1971) found a third factor, in addition 
to the two reported by Mirels (1970,), with a sample of women. 
This factor pertained to the controlability of being liked or 
respected. Duke and Nowicki (1974), found that internality 
related to high achievement for males while it was externality 
that related to high achievement for females on the newly 
developed Adult Nowicki Strickland Internal External Scale. 
Nowicki and Walker (1973), found that with social desireability 
controlled for, females scoring low on a social desireability 
scale and high internal on a locus of control measure, were 
high achievers as measured by achievement test scores. Both 
(40.) 
of the previously cited studies suggest that some females 
may deny responsibility for their. academic achievements 
because of the social undesirability of feeling themselves 
as in competition with men. The evidence for differential 
responding by males and females, however, was considered not 
substantial enough to indicate the use of sex as an independent 
variable. Post hoc analyses were planned only if it was apparent 
from the data that sex factors were operating. 
,----
B. METHOD 
---------------, 
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1. SUBJECTS 
A total of 54 middle school (grades 6 - 8) children from 
two private schools in Richmond, Virginia, were employed on a 
voluntary basis for participation in the present study. Twenty-
four of the subjects were male students from St. Christopher's 
School and 30 were female students from St. Catherine's School. 
The breakdown of subjects for grades was as follows: Eighth -
24, Seventh - 26, Sixth - 4. Two subjects who had already 
taken part in the second experimental session were dropped 
from the study when it was discovered that they did not answer 
all the Locus of Control Scale items. Twelve other subjects 
took part in the pre-testing but not in the task situation and 
thus were not used in the analysis. 
2. APPARATUS AND MATERIALS 
a. Setting 
The initial phase of the study was conducted in the 
auditorium at St. Christopher's School and a large class-
room at St. Catherine's School. This enabled the experi-
menter to administer the pre-tests to a large number of 
students at the same time. The task situation and post-
testing were administered in smaller rooms at each school. 
b. Locus of Control Scales 
Two locus of control measures were used on a pre 
and post-task basis in the present investigation. The 
Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Questionnaire 
was chosen because it is specific to the academic achieve-
( 4 2. ) 
ment situation, limits agents of external control to 
significant others in the child's life, and provides 
separate subscales for measuring control orientations 
for positive and negative events in addition to a total 
score. MacDonald (1973) states that "the IAR is a care-
fully developed scale that shows acceptable reliability 
and evidence of divergent and convergent validity (p. 195) ." 
Correlations with social desirability test scores have 
been found to be rather low. Additionally,the IAR is 
one of the most wid~ly used Children's locus of control 
measures. Prociuk and Lussier (1975), in their biblio-
graphy for 1974-1975, report that it was the most widely 
used scale with children for that period, and was used 
in 6% of all studies dealing with locus of control. A 
copy of the IAR and scoring instructions appear in 
Appendix B. 
The Lotus of Control Scale for Success-Failure 
developed by Epstein and Komorita (1971) was also used 
in the present study. To this writer's knowledge this 
scale was only used in the previously mentioned study 
by Epstein and Komorita. It was used in the present study 
because the items are worded in such a manner that the 
scale can be used to provide a measure of control orienta-
tion specific to the task situation. Epstein and Komorita 
developed the scale by rewording 34 items obtained from 
Bialer's (1961) Locus of Control Scale and Battle and 
Rotter's (1963) Picture Test of Internal-External Control. 
(.SJ.) 
An item analysis of these 34 items consisted of correla-
tions with total score (internal consistency criterion), 
yielding 14 items which discriminated significantly at 
the 5% level. These 14 items were used as the Locus of 
Control Scale for Success-Failure. Epstein and Komorita 
(1971) report that the split-half reliabilities, with the 
Spearman-Brown correction, were .79 and .70 under success 
and failure conditions respectively and conclude that the 
scale is moderately reliable and adequate. Sec Appendix 
D for a copy of the Locus of Control Scale for Success-
Failure and scoring instructions. 
c. Additional Printed Materials 
Various task instruction and answer sheets, conocnt 
forms, and debriefing sheets, all of which arc explained 
in the experimental procedures, were used. 
3. PROCEDURE 
A consent form which briefly described the experimental 
procedures, was sent hor.1c with a nu.'":1bcr of students for their 
parents to read over and sign. Only those students whose 
parents gave permission were used in the study. Also, all 
subjects were asked to read and sign a~ infor~ed consent !orm 
(sec Appendix M). 
The experimenter met with the subjects in three large 
groups for the first of two sessions. The purpose cf this 
session was to obtain ~easures of the subject's control 
orientation prior to taking part in the expcri~ental task 
(Lt 'c • I 
situation. The initial instructions given to the subjects 
were as follows: 
Scientists do experiments to find out more about 
the world around us. Some experiments study people 
and their behavior. I am particularly interested 
in finding out more about what is involved in the 
process of succeeding or failing at coming up with 
new ideas or discoveries. In about two weeks I 
will meet with each of you individually. You will 
be asked to read about several experiments. and decide 
what was discovered in those experiments. To give 
you a better understanding of what you will be expected 
to do, I'm going to give you a sample of the task now. 
The task consisted of a brief description of an experiment 
followed by a list of ten possible results. The subjects were 
instructed to read the experiment carefully and then to indicate 
whether or not they thought the listed results were actually 
found in the experiment by writing true or false in front of 
each statement. The experiment described in the sample task 
and the three later used in the experimental task situation were 
fictitious. The subjects were unaware of this until they were 
debriefed. A copy of the sample task appears in Appendix H 
and instructions in Appendix G. 
The experimenter read over the sample task instructions 
with the subjects and asked them to try doing the task and 
think about how they might do on a task like this. When all of 
the subjects had finished the sample task the experimenter 
handed out the Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure, 
labele~ Questionnaire 1 on the subject's copy, and gave the 
subjects the following instructions. 
I am not going to tell you the right answers today 
because you may see this same experiment or a similar 
one later. Pretend that you had been given a grade 
and think about how well or how poorly you might have 
done when you answer this set of questions. Read the 
,--------------------------------- ---- -- --------, 
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instructions carefully before answering the questions. 
The original instructions to the Locus of Control Scale 
for Success-Failure as used by Epstein and Komorita.(1971) were 
·slightly altered to fit the nature of the present study. A 
copy of the scale, scoring instructions, and the original 
instructions used by Epstein and Komorita appear in Appendix 
D. The instructions used in the present study were as follows. 
This task was performed by other children. After they 
finished, some children found out they had done well 
and others found out they had done poorly. When 
these children were asked "why did you do well or 
poorly?" they gave the following .reasons. As you 
read each reason think about how well or how poorly 
you would expect to do on this task. Then, show how 
much you agree or disagree with the reason by circl-
ing the number which is closest to what you believe. 
The fourteen item Locus of Control Scale for Success-
Failure was thus answered in direct relation to the subject's 
perception of the sample task, and provided a measure of the 
subject's control orientation to the experimental task prior 
to the experimental manipulations. A copy of this scale as 
used for the pre-test appears in Appendix E. 
When all subjects had finished the Locus of Control Scale 
for Success-Failure, the Intellectual Achievement Responsibility 
Questionnaire, labeled Questionnaire 2, on the subject's c9py, 
was administered to all subjects. This scale provided a more 
generalized measure of the subject's control orientation, i.e., 
that of the academic achievement situation. A copy of this 
scale as used in the present study appears in Appendix C. 
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of nine treat-
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ment groups, with six subjects in each group, prior to the 
second experimental session. Three of these groups received 
skill oriented (personal control) instructions, three of the 
groups received chance oriented (no personal control) instruc-
tions, and three groups received no specific instructions of 
this kind. The later three groups served as a control for the 
skill-chance instruction manipulation. These groups were 
further designated to receive a particular type of task feed-
back, such that one of the groups receiving each of the three 
modes of instruction received falsified success feedback, 
one of each of the instruction groups received falsified 
failure feedback, and one of each of the instruction groups 
received no feedback. The no feedback factor served as a con-
trol on the success-failure feedback manipulation. This yielded 
the following nine treatment combinations: 
Skill (personal control) oriented instructions 
Success feedback 
Failure feedback 
No feedback 
Chance (no personal control) oriented instructions 
Success feedback 
Failure feedback 
No feedback 
No control oriented instructions 
Success feedback 
Failure feedback 
No feedback 
Each subject was seen individually for the second phase 
of the experiment. This session took place at least two weeks 
after the first session. Upon arriving for this session each 
subject was asked to be seated at a large desk across from the 
experimenter. 
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Each subject was given a set of instructions and asked 
to read. them silently while the e·xperimenter read them aloud. 
Each subject received the same task instructions as were given 
for the sample task in the first experimental session. Addi-
tionally, each subject was instructed that they would receive 
three written descriptions of experiments and asked to hand 
each back when they were finished so that the experimenter 
could examine them. 
The instructions from this point differed for the subjects 
depending on which treatment group they had been randomly 
assigned to. The additional instructions for the three "skill" 
oriented or personal control groups emphasized the logical 
connection betwemthe described experiments and what was really 
discovered in them, and that the subject's knowledge of people 
would help them discover the "right" answers. These instruc-
tions were intended to give the subject the impression that 
personal skill or ability would be an important factor determin-
ing performance. Subjects in the three chance-oriented or no 
personal control groups received.additional instructions which 
emphasized the lack of adequate information on which to base 
decisions and that the subject's performance would depend largely 
on guess-work. These instructions were intended to give the 
subject the impression that personal skill or ability was of 
little importance and that the subject would have little personal 
control over task performance. The subjects assigned to the 
remaining three groups received no additional instructions. 
At the bottom of each instruction sheet were three questions 
dealing with task motivation which were deemed necessary to 
determine the validity of the experimental procedures. Each 
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subject was asked to rate on a seven point scale how important 
the task.was to him/her, how important it was to do well, and 
how well the subject thought he/she would do. A copy of each 
of the three different instruction sheets appears in Appendices 
I, J, and K, skill, chance, and no control orientation, 
respectively. 
Upon completing the instruction sheet each subject was 
given the three task sheets one at a time. Each of the three 
task sheets contained a brief description of a fictitious ex-
periment with ten possible results listed below. As with 
the sample task, the subject's task was to write TRUE in front 
of the results they believed were actually found in that 
experiment and FALSE in front of those they believed were not 
found in the experiment. Each subject received the three 
task sheets in the same order, each sheet representing one 
trial of the task. The experimenter examined each task sheet 
immediately after the subject was finished and handed it back 
to the subject. For those subjects in the three success condi-
tion groups the experimenter wrote 80% correct - very good, 
90% correct - excellent, and 90% correct - excellent, at the 
bottom of the task sheet for the three respective trials of 
the task. For those subjects in the three failure condition 
groups the experimenter wrote 20% correct - poor, 10% correct -
very poor, and 10% correct - very poor, at the bottom of the 
task sheet for the ·three respective trials of the task. For 
those subjects in the no-feedback condition groups the experi-
menter merely examined the answers and handed the task sheet 
back to the subject. A copy of each of the three 
( 4 9 • ) 
task trials appears in Appendix L. 
Irrunediately after completion of the task each subject was 
again administered the Locus of Control Scale for Success-
Failure and the Intellectual Achievement Responsibility 
Questionnaire, in that order. Each subject was instructed 
to answer the questions on both scales based on how they felt 
"right now". The instructions to the Locus of Control Scale 
• 
for Success-Failure were slightly altered to be in line with 
the fact that the subject had completed the task situation. 
Thus the sentence, "As you read each reason think about how 
well or how poorly you would expect to do on this task", which 
appeared in the pre-test instructions, was changed to, "As 
you read each reason think about how well or how poorly you 
think you did on this task", on the post-test instructions. 
A copy of the Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure with 
the altered instructions as used in the post-test appears in 
Appendix F. 
Following all experimental procedures each subject was 
given a standard debriefing sheet which the experimenter read 
over with the subject. This sheet explained the deceptions in 
which the subject was involved and the true nature of the 
research. Each subject was given an opportunity to ask ques-
tions. All subjects were asked not to discuss the study with 
anyone else until completion of the data collection. All 
subjects were thanked for their participation in the research. 
A copy of the debriefing sheet appears in Appendix N. 
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C. RESULTS 
Analysis of Locus of Control Scores 
A three factor, mixed analysis of variance with repeated 
measures on one factor was used to test the effects of task 
instruction (skill vs. chance vs. no control bias) and task 
feedback (success vs. failure vs. no feedback) on trials of 
I-E score. Locus of control scores (I-E) were obtained both 
before and after the experimental task manipulations, and 
are represented by the repeated measures factor in the design. 
A pictorial representation of the design appears in Figure 1. 
Separate analyses as depicted in Figure 1 were performed 
on the Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure and the three 
scores yielded by the Intellectual Achievement Responsibility 
Questionnaire - r+ subscale, I- subscale, and total IAR score. 
Each of these four 
Cochran's test (C= 
of variance. 
analyses will 
s 2 largest 
(s2 
be reported separately. 
was used to test for homogeniety 
1. Analysis of Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure Scores 
Means and standard deviations for scores on the Locus of 
Control Scale for Success-Failure are presented in Table 1, 
Appendix 0. The Cochran Test for homogeniety of variance 
revealed no significant differences in variance among the 
treatment groups (C= .2007; C=. 951 91 ll= .2535). Analysis 
of the data revealed a significant trials X feerlbackinteraction 
(F=G.275; F _951 21 45 =2.:'J9; p <.005). A summary of this 
analysis appears in Table 2, Appendix O. A graph of this inter-
action appears in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Trials X Feedback Interaction for Locus of 
Control Scale for Success-Failure Scores 
F-Tests were used to examine the simple effects of the sig-
nificant trials X feedback interaction, and it was explored in 
several ways. First, the rate of change from pre to post-test-
ing of the three feedback groups compared two at a time was ex-
amined. These analyses yielded a significant trials by groups 
interaction for success versus failure feedback groups (F = 11.59; 
F 95 , l, 45 = 4.06; p<..OOS) and for failure versus no feedback 
(F = 6.516; F 95 , l, 45 = 4.06; p <.025}. Sununaries of these analyses 
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appear in Appendix o, Tables 3 and 5, respectively. The 
trials by· groups interaction was ·not significant when the 
success and no feedback conditions were compared. A sum-
mary of this analysis appears in Table 4 of Appendix O. 
These analyses indicate that the failure condition resulted 
in differential rates of change in I-E score when compared 
to both the success and no feedback conditions, while the 
change in I-E scores under the success condition was essentially 
no different from that which occurred when subjects received 
no performance feedback. 
The change in I-E score from pre to post-testing was 
also examined under each feedback condition separately. The 
failure condition resulted in a significant change (F = 12.72; 
F. 95 , l, 45 = 4.06) in an external direction (+4.21) while 
no significant differences were found from pre to post-testing 
for the success (-1.62) and no feedback conditions (-.05). 
Summaries of these analyses for the success, failure, and no 
feedback conditions appear in Appendix 0, Tables 6, 7, and 8, 
respectively. 
The simple effects for the original trials by feedback 
interaction were lastly explored by examining the differences 
among feedback groups at both the pre and post-testing. 
There were no significant differences among the three feedback 
groups on the pretest. A summary of this analysis appears in 
Table 9, Appendix O. The analysis of the post-test I-E 
scores for the three feedback groups demonstrated that there 
were significant differences among the groups. (F = 4.85; 
F 95 , 2 , 51 = 3.186). A summary of this analysis appears in 
( 5 4. ) 
Table 10, Appendix O. A Neuman-Keuls' Multiple Range Test 
was used to test the differences among means for the three 
feedback groups. This analysis demonstrated that the failure 
group (X = 29.28) was significantly more external than the 
success group (X = 23.33) on the post-test. Neither the success 
group nor the failure group were significantly different from 
the no feedback group (X = 26.167). A summary of this analysis 
appears in Table 11, Appendix O. 
2. Analysis of the IAR Scores. 
a. Total I Score 
Means and standard diviations for treatment groups on the 
total I score are presented in Table 1, Appendix P. 
The Cochran Test for homogeniety of variance was not 
significant (C = .1728; c 
.9 5' 9' 11 = . 2535) ' thus 
homogeniety of variance may be assumed. The analysis 
of the total I score revealed a significant trials 
effect (F = 5.04; F •951 l, 45 = 4.06) indicating an 
overall change across treatment groups toward a more 
internal orientation from the pre-test (X = 25.704) 
to the post-test (X = 26.759). A summary of this 
analysis is presented in Table 2, Appendix P. 
b. + I Subscale 
Means and standard deviations for treatment groups on 
+ the I subscale are presented in Table 1, Appendix Q. 
The Cochran Test for homogeniety of variance was not 
significant (C = .2177; c.95,9, 11 = .2535)' thus 
homogeniety of variance can be assumed. The analysis 
( ., . ., . ) 
+ of the IAR I subscalc data revealed no significant 
effects. 1\ summ.:iry of this .:inalysis appears in Table 2, 
Aiwendix Q. 
c. I Subscale 
Means and standard deviations for treatment groups on 
the I subscalc arc presented in Table 1, Appendix R. 
The Cochran test for homogcnicty of variance was r.ot 
significant (C = .1746; c.95 , 91 11 = .2535), thu::; 
hornogcnicty of variance can be assumed. The analysi5 
of the I subscale score data revealed a significant 
trials effect (F = 7.819; ~95 , 1, 4 5 = 4. 06), indic<it-
ing a significant shift toward a r.ore intcrn<il oricn-
• 
tation from pre-test ci = 12.352) to po::;t-test ci = 13.185) 
across all groups. A su::-::lari' of this an.1lysis is pre-
sentcd in Table 2, Appendix R. 
t\nalys is of Task Z·:ot i vat ion Oue:H ions 
The subjects provided ratings on th rec t.l::;i-; r..oti v.1t ion 
questions irn:::ediatcly after receiving the t.1sk instruction 
questions and prior to taking part in the experimental ta::;k 
situation and receiving pcrforr.ancc feedback. These question::; 
were asked only once. A two factor ana!ysis of variance 
(factorial design) was used to analyse the c!fcct::; of task 
instruction (skill, chance, and no control orientation) and 
pcrfor::-.. 1nce fcedb.1ck (success, failure, .u~d no !ccdbact:} 
on subjects ratings for each of the three task ~otivat1on 
questions. A pictorial representation of the dcnign appears 
in Figure 3. 
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SKILL CHANCE NO COOTROL 
Figure 3. Design for Analysis of Task Motivation Questions. 
1. Task Motivation Question 1: "How important is this 
task to you? 
Means and standard deviations for treatment groups on 
subjects ratings of how important the task was to them appear 
in Table 1, Appendix S. A nonsignificant Cochran Test (C = .2042; 
C = .3286) permitted the assumption of homogeniety of 95, 9, 5 
variance. Analysis of the data revealed no significant re-
sults. A summary of this analysis is presented in Table 2, 
Appendix S. 
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2. Task Motivation Question 2: How important is it 
that you do well on this task? 
Means and standard deviations for t~eatment groups on 
subjects ratings of how important it was that they do well 
on the task appear in Table I, Appendix T. The Cochran Test 
was not significant (C - .1629; C 5 = .3286) , thus homo-.9 5 I 9 I 
geniety of variance may be assumed. The analysis revealed no 
significant results. Table 2, Appendix T summarizes this 
analysis. 
3. Task Motivation Question 3: How well do you think 
you will do on this task? 
Means and standard deviations for treatment groups on 
subjects ratings of how well they expected to do on the 
task are presented in Table 1, Appendix u. A nonsignificant 
Cochran Test (C = .1730; ~951 91 5 = .3286) indicated that 
homogeniety of variance could be assumed. The results of the 
analysis revealed no significant results. A summary of the 
analysis is presented in Table 2, Appendix U. 
( 5 8. ) 
D. DISCUSSION 
The present investigation attempted to further explore 
the effects of two variables which Allin (1978) hypothesized 
as being important in influencing the modification of locus 
of control. These variables have been suggested in the 
literature, but there has been a definite paucity of well 
controlled studies designed to test their effects. Based pri-
marily on th~ work of Eisenman (1972) Allin predicted that 
the experience of personal control (skill instructions) in a 
task situation would lead to an increase in internal control, 
while the experience of no personal control (chance instruc-
tions) would lead to an increase in external control. Allin 
further predicted that, based on studies by Sobel (1974) and 
Andrisani and Nestel (1976), the experience of success would 
lead to greater internal control while the experience of 
failure would lead to greater external control. The work of 
Epstein and Komorita (1971) and Brecher and Denmark (1972) , 
not reviewed by Allin, also clearly support his hypotheses. 
Since Allin's results demonstrated significant interaction 
effects but failed to reveal any significant main effects by 
the independent variables, further research was deemed necessary 
to better understand the relationships among these variables. 
The Rotter I-E scale, used in the Allin study, was intended to 
be a broad gauge instrument and not designed to allow for high 
prediction in specific situations (Rotter, 1975). Soloman and 
Oberlander (1974) state that "since a control orientation pre-
sumably develops out of a person's experiences in a variety of 
(59.) 
particular situations, and it is likely that for many indi-
viduals these experiences have been very different in different 
kinds of situations, it is logical to expect that an indi-
viduals' control orientation in one class of situations may 
be very different from what it is in another class of situa-
tions (p. 133) ." The Rotter I-E scale has been widely 
criticised because of its generality and multidimensionality 
concerning three important parameters of control orientation: 
1. Generalization across persons (Gurin, et. al., 1969) 
and across reinforcement areas (Mirels, 1970) 
2. Agents of external control (Hersch and Scheibe, 
1967; Levenson, 1973 a, 1974). 
3. Types of reinforcement: positive versus negative 
(Crandall, et. al., 1965; Mischel, et. al., 1974). 
It was the contention of the present study that differential 
variance on any of these parameters could have obscured 
Allin's results .. The present study employed the Intellectual 
Achievement Responsibility Questionnaire (Crandall, et. al., 
1965) to measure locus of control orientation. The IAR was 
designed to be specific to the academic achievement situation, 
limit agents of external control to significant others in the 
child's life, and assess control orientation for positive and 
negative events separately. In addition, following the reason-
ing of Soloman and Oberlander, a task specific measure of locus 
of control, developed by Epstein and Komorita (1971) was used 
in the present study to assess changes in control orientation 
specific to the task situation. The present study also con-
sidered the possibility that control orientation may undergo 
( t,O. ) 
diffcrcnti<il :rodi!ic.-.tion with rcnpcct to tho t\o"O :wxcn. 
Thus, in essence the present study wnu n rcplicntion of 
Allin's ntudy uning two nc.llcs r.-orc npcci!1c in n.1turo th.1n 
the Rotter I-E nc.llc <ind .1 r.-orc ntr1nc;cnt <lcnic;n. Tho 
hypotheses were idcntic.ll to thoae in tho Allin ntudy. 
Person.ll control (skill inntructionn) in n tnnk nituntton 
wns expected to lead to greater intcrnnl control and no purnonnl 
control (chance inutructionn) to qrcntcr cxtornnl control. 111 
<1<lclition, it 'l•.'.lll prc.•dictcd lthlt uucccna on the t.·i:i~ would r1·::ult 
in greater internal control and failure in 9rcatur external 
control. ?io intcr.-1ct1on cf !cctn were h:,•pothcn i :c<l .i:t t?wrc 
was little evidence upon which to bane nuch prcd1cuonn. 
7h<? hypothcsin rcl.lt.1.n9 to BHu.1tionll controHni;ill \'<,•r:rnn 
ch.lncc versus no control binning inntructionn) rccoivod no 
support in the present study. ;,llin'n (1979) rcnultn .1.nd1-
cating that instructional control b1anin9 1ntornctcd with type 
of feedback was not nuL1Jt1.1nti.1tc·d. ~;o nl<Jni! 1C.lflt (~!! .. ·ctn !or 
t:,•pc of instruct1on -..;ere !our.d on ci thcr o! tho tV'O locu:s o! 
control =ctlsurcs used 1n tho prcn~nt ntudy. 
r.ot c!fcctive ln producing ~ nr.111-chtlnco b1an1nq o! nu~j~ctr.. 
Based on the results o! tl s~1ll-chanco rtlting nctlla which 
It v~n oriq1ntllly 
( Gl.) 
proposed to use a skill-chance rating scale as Allin did. 
This was-deleted from the present study however, because 
of its similarity to several items on the Locus of Control 
Scale for Success-Failure~ most noteably numbers six and 
nine (see Appendix D) . It was assumed that the task specific 
Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure would replace the 
skill-chance rating scale. The analysis of this scale revealed 
no significant effects for type of instruction, however. The 
only evidence to indicate that the skill chance biasing did 
have some effect appeared in the anaiysis of the rating for 
the task motivation question, "How well do you think you will 
do on this task?" This question was asked immediately after 
the control biasing instructions were given. The main effect 
for instructions approached significance (p< .1). The subjects 
given skill instructions tended to have a higher expectancy 
for success (X = 4.8), than those given chance instructions 
(X = 4.2), while those subjects given neither skill nor chance 
instructions tended to rate the question similar to the skill 
instructed group. These results must be interpreted with 
extreme caution since the instructions X feedback interaction 
also approached significance (p < .1) , even though the question 
had been asked prior to the time the subjects had actually 
received differential performance feedback. 
Eisenman (1972) using the Rotter I-E scale, found a 
significant shift toward an external direction for subjects 
given chance instructions, a significant shift toward a more 
internal orient~tion for skill jnstructed subjects, and no 
r--·--
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significant change for the control group. Eisenman's subjects, 
however,·were exposed to three d~fferent situations in which 
they experienced the skill or chance situation (3 verbal 
conditioning experiments). The subjects in the present study 
received the instructions only once and took part in only 
one task situation. This suggests that it may take more than 
one exposure to skill versus chance situations to significantly 
effect control orientation. Also, the subjects in both the 
Allin and Eisenman studies were college students while the 
subjects in the present study were middle school age children. 
It is possible that these children were not able to understand 
the implications of the skill-chance biasing in terms of 
how much personal control they experienced in the situation. 
The failure of the skill-chance instructions to result 
in changes in subjects scores on the IAR may have been due to 
the fact that the IAR limits agents of external control to 
significant others in the child's life. Thus, it is possible 
that had a personal control - no personal control biasing of 
subjects been effected by the skill-chance instructions, the 
IAR would not have been sensitive to this dimension of control 
orientation. 
The results did provide some support for the hypothesis 
concerning success versus failure performance feedback. The 
results of the analysis of the Locus of Control Scale for 
Success-Failure were fairly clear. Subjects experiencing failure 
changed significantly toward a more external orientation and 
subjects experiencing success tended to become more internal, 
,----------------------------------------------
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although this was not significant. The rate of change of the 
failure group was also significantly different·from the no 
feedback group, while the success group was not. This indi-
cates the possibility that failure may be a more powerful 
force in the child's life. On the pre-test there were no 
differences among the three feedback groups while on the 
post-test the failure group was significantly more external 
than the success group, while neither success nor failure 
were significantly different from the no feedback group. 
The rate of change of the success and failure groups was 
also significantly different. These results indicate that 
performance feedback had important effec~s on the subjects 
control orientation for the experimental task arid in the 
directions predicted. This occurred despite some weaknesses 
noted in the Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure. 
The first nine items are worded in the positive direction and 
the last five items are worded in the negative direction. A 
few of the subjects seemed to have difficulty adjusting to 
this switch as there seemed to be a change in responding in 
terms of control orientation that occurred at this point which 
is difficult to explain otherwise. It should be emphasized that 
this is only conjecture on the part of the experimenter, and 
at most occurred in only a very small minority of the subjects. 
The results from the analysis of the IAR indicated no 
significant effects in regard to type of performance feedback 
experienced. This leaves unanswered the question as to how 
changes in situational control, as are apparent from the 
--------------~--------------------, 
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analysis of the Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure, 
generalize to the larger spheres of control orientation. The 
IAR, which Crandall developed as a more specific measure than 
the Rotter I-E Scale, may itself be multidimensional. 
In a recent study, Andrews and Debus (1978) found that 
with the use of a task specific measure of causality attribu-
tion, clear results were indicated that temporal persistence 
and resistance to extinction were found to be positively 
related to attribution of failure to insufficient effort and 
negatively related to attribution of failure to ability and 
task difficulty, in line with their hypotheses. The IAR, 
however, showed only relatively "limited and weak relations 
with persistence and with the attributional responses made 
for success and failure experiences (p. 158)". These authors 
conclude that "the IAR may not be as suitable a measure of 
attributional predispositions as has been apparently assumed 
in many previous studies. As a measure designed to apply to 
achievement situations generally, the IAR may have limited 
application in predicting attributional predisposition in a 
specific task or situation. Investigations that base their 
findings solely on attrib~ticnal response~ measured by means of 
the IAR perhaps should therefore be interpreted with cautiun, 
und use of behavioral mea~ures should be preferred in future 
attribution studies (pp. 163-164)". 
The only significant finding in the present study with 
regard to the IAR was a significant shift towards greater 
internal control across all treatment groups on the I subscale 
and the total I score. This finding may have been unique to 
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the population studied. The students at the two schools from 
which subjects in the present study were drawn are almost 
exclusively White and from upper middle class or above 
families. Several of the subjects in the failure condition 
continued to think they had done poorly even after they were 
debriefed and assured they hadn't really failed. After being 
thanked by the experimenter, two of the subjects apologized 
for having done so poorly as they were leaving the room. 
The experimenter assured these two that they really hadn't 
done poorly. Several of the teachers reported that students 
had returned to class talking about how poorly they had done. 
The results from the analysis of the task specific Locus of 
Control Scale for Success-Failure indicated that failure may 
be a very potent force for these children; and the experience 
of failure or the fear of it may have been dealt with by 
internalizing their failure experiences. These results also 
suggest the possibility that the I subscale may be less 
stable than the I+, contradictory to Crandall et. al.'s 
(1965) data. 
The evidence from the present study highlights the need 
for a better understanding of just what the concept of locus of 
control is and seriously questions the viability of a general~ 
ized locus of control measure, even for a fairly specific 
domain such as the academic achievement situation, which the 
IAR purportedly measures. At this point, much further research 
is necessary before we can determine what dimensionsof control 
orientation can be grouped together in a single scale. 
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The present study also considered the possibility of 
differential responding on the locus of control measures by 
males and females. A thorough examination of the data revealed 
little difference among males and females in terms of their 
rates of change from pre to post-testing, thus no post hoc 
statistical tests were applied. 
The importance of gaining a better understanding of 
factors involved in the modification of locus of control is 
most evident in the areas of psychotherapy and education. 
Gaining a more internal control orientation is generally 
considered to be of primary importance to the therapeutic 
process (Lefcourt, 1972). Externality has generally been 
associated with poorer adjustment, higher anxiety, and less 
positive affect states (Platt and Eisenman, 1968; Ray and 
Katahn, 1968; Wareheim and Woodson, 1971; Watson, 1967). 
The locus of control literature has also demonstrated that 
the development of internal control leads to increases in 
information seeking, and information utilization (Crandall, 
1970; Davis and Phares, 1967; Phares, 1969; Lefcourt, 1967). 
In light of these studies, a knowledge of what factors bring 
about an increase in internal control may be crucial to 
education. Stevens (:'172) believes that there may be a re-
ciprocal relationship between intelligence and locus of control, 
that is, not only does intelligence mediate internal-external 
control orientation, but also internal-external control orien-
tation effects the development of intelligence. 
The value of an internal control orientation has been 
espoused throughout the locus of control literature. The 
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present study, however, also explored the factors which may 
be involved in bringing about gr~ater external control. The 
importance of a better understanding of these factors is less 
obvious. The finding by DuCuette, et. al. (1972) that mal-
adjustment in their sample was due to a lack of homogeniety 
between control orientations for positive and negative events 
points in this direction. Therapeutic intervention could thus 
involve increasing either internal or external control depend-
ing on the nature of the relationship between control expec-
tancies for positive and negative events within the individual. 
Rotter (1966) suggested that the relationship between I-E 
scores and maladjustment is likely not a linear one but that 
extremes in either direction would theoretically lead to dif-
ficulties. Gurin and Gurin (1970), from their studies with 
disadvantaged persons, conclude that, "Clearly, the problem of 
learning new expectancies is no longer one of changing from an 
external to an internal orientation. Rather, poor people are 
presented with the much more difficult problem of learning to 
make very complex judgements as to when an internal orientation 
reflects intrapunitiveness rather than a sense of efficacy, 
when an external orientation becomes defensive rather than a 
realistic blaming of the social system. Moreover, these 
judgements must be made at a time when objective opportunities 
are in flux, making an accurate picture of reality all the 
more difficult (p. 104)". 
It is pertinent at this point to mention Lefcourt's 
(1976) caution against viewing locus of control as a personality 
trait, as if it were a possession of the individual. Lefcourt 
(68.) 
argues that the stability and change which are evidenced in the 
locus of· control literature only make sense if individuals are 
sald to construct events, some of which pertain to causality, 
rather than that they have a locus of control trait or are 
internals or externals. The evidence which has been presented 
which questions the viability of locus of control as unidimen-
sional also supports this contention. In light of this data, 
we would have to speak of locus of control traits for each 
factor or dimension such as academic achievement, interper-
sonal relations, physical areas; etc. At present our lack of 
knowledge about how locus of control generalizes from situation 
to situation makes it absurd to conceptualize a locus of con-
trol trait. The present study, then was not an attempt to 
modify a personality characteristic or trait, but rather an 
investigation designed to examine how specific control expec-
tancies might change within a specific situation, the task 
itself and the academic achievement situation. The present study 
provides evidence that performance feedback is an important 
factor in modifying control orientation for a very specific 
situation, but how this generalizes to larger domains, such 
as academic achievement is left unanswered. 
The present study also examined motivational variables 
that the literature indicated might effect the modification 
of locus of control. 
The value of the task for an individual subject and their 
motivation to do well might effect the results. Naditch (1973) 
found that there was a significant correlation between 
( 6 9 • ) 
internal-external control orientation and three areas of com-
petance (school achievement, sports achievement, and social 
popularity) with male subjects, only for those subjects who 
indicated that these areas were important to them. The 
subjects were asked to answer two questions pertaining to the 
value they placed on the task: "How important is this task to 
you?" and "How important is it that you do well on this task?" 
Subjects were also asked to indicate how well they expected 
to do on the task, since this factor may have important effects 
on control orientation (Gurin and Gurin, 1970). For instance, 
a person expecting to do well might react differently to 
success than a person expecting to do poorly. Allin (1978) 
asked his subjects to provide ratings on these three questions 
immediately after they received the task instructions. Allin 
analysed these results in a two factor design, task instructions 
(skill versus chance) and performance feedback (success versus 
failure versus no feedback). His results indicated that: 
(a) the subjects did not differ in terms of the importance 
they placed on the task, (b) skill instructed subjects indi-
cated that it was more important that they do well than chance 
instructed subjects, (c) the success feedback group had a 
higher expectation for doing well than the no feedback group. 
The results of the analysis of the three task motivation ques-
tions in the present study revealed no significant results, 
except for the trends already discussed for the question 
pertaining to the subjects' expectancy for doing well. The 
most viable explanation for the lack of significance with 
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regard to the task motivation questions is that the skill-
chance instructions were not effective with the children 
used as subjects in the present study as was discussed with 
regard to their responses to the locus of control measures. 
Several other subject variables not specifically addressed 
in the present study which the literature indicates might have 
effects on the modification of locus of control provide 
interesting possibilities for future research. 
Class, race, and cultural differences in locus of control 
orientation have been well documented in the literature. Gurin, 
et. al. 's (1969) finding that it is externality in Blacks that 
was related to more socially active coping measures is particu-
larly relevant to the present study. It may be that various 
social and ethnic group members in the sample would react 
differently to the independent variables in terms of shifts 
in control orientation. Although this factor was not specifically 
controlled for in the present study, it has been shown that 
the IAR is relatively insensitive to differences in social 
class and ethnic group (Solomon, Houlihan, and Parelius, 1969). 
Crandall, et. al. (1965) suggested that the more general scales 
such as the Rotter I-E may show race and class differences 
while the IAR does not because the former "refer to broad and 
nonspecific situations in the general environment where there 
are real differences in the power of members of different 
social strata to exert effective influence, while the IAR refers 
to school situations where teachers exhortations about respon-
sibility and reinforcement contingencies for achievement efforts 
are the same for children from different social strata (p. 104) ." 
(71.) 
Random sampling was relied upon to control for several 
other factors which previous research has demonstrated to be 
important to locus of control orientation as it was explored 
in the present study. The most widely investigated of these 
factors has been the differential responding of individuals 
classified as internals and externals. The research has 
indicated that there are differences in subjects grouped as 
internals versus externals with respect to attribution of 
responsibility for success and failure (Davis and Davis, 1972; 
Lefcourt, Hogg, Struthers, and Holmes, 1975; Gilmore and Minton, 
1974; Kaiser, 1975; Kroventz, 1974), changes in confidence 
levels after experiences of success or failure (Feather, 1968; 
Ryckman, Gold, and Rhodda, 1971; Ryckman and Rhodda, 1971), 
reactions to threat or defensiveness (Phares and Lamiell, 
1974; Phares,Ritchie, and Davis, 1968; Phares, 1971), sensiti-
vity to environmental stimuli (DuCette and. Wolk, 1973), 
response to intrinsic versus extrinsic feedback (Baron, et. al., 
1974), and performance under skill and chance conditions (Watson 
and Baurnal, 1967). The present study made no attempt to 
differentiate between internals and externals. There is little 
consensus in these studies as to how to differentiate between 
internals and externals. 
Random sampling was also relied on to control for subject 
differences in need achievement and self esteem. Weiner and 
Kuckla (1970) found that individuals high in need achievement 
tend to accept responsibility for their success but not their 
failures, while no such relationship was evident for persons 
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low in need achievement. Epstein and Komorita (1971) found 
that it was the individuals who were in the mid range on a 
self esteem measure who differed most on the locus of control 
scale with respect to success-failure experiences. Task 
difficulty (Weiner and Kuckla, 1970) ,degree of success or 
failure (Kroventz, 1974), and degree of past succ~ssful 
experience (Lefcourt and Ladwig, 1965 b) have also been sug-
gested as important factors in control orientation. 
The present research has indicated that subjects may 
change their control orientation in a specific situation with-
out effecting their control orientation for a more generalized 
domain. Future research would do well to concentrate on more 
clearly defining the parameters of locus of control modif ica-
tion in specific situations and examining more closely how 
changes in control orientation in one dimension effect control 
orientation in another. Rubner (1975) developed the Situational 
Locus of Responsibility (SLR) Inventory which he believes 
"will permit examining of the situational multidimensionality 
of the I-E construct (p. 4259)". The SLR was constructed for 
use with seventh to twelfth grade pupils. It consists of 
three, twenty-four item scales, each offering common experiences 
involving friends, school and family respectively. Each of the 
three subscales contains positive and negative experiences. 
"The subject is asked first to decide whether'the experience 
is 'within' or 'beyond' his or her control and then how much 
within or beyond his control it is by distributing five points 
as either 5 - O (completely within) , 4 - 1 (mostly within} , 
,-
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3 - 2 (slightly within), 2 - 3 (slightly beyond), 1 - 4 
(mostly beyond), or 0 - 5 (completely beyond) (p. 4260) ". 
This scale has received little attention but its format 
offers interesting possibilities for the examination of 
situational control orientation ln a wide variety of areas. 
(7'1.) 
APPENDIX A 
The Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale 
and Scoring Instructions 
The Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale is a 
23-item forced choice questionnaire with six filler items. It 
is scored in the external direction. 
I more strongly believe that: 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents 
punish them too much. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that 
their parents are too easy with them. 
a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives 
are partly due to bad luck. 
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes 
they make. 
a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is 
because people don't take enough interest in 
politics. 
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard 
people try to prevent them. 
a. In the long run people get the respect they 
deserve in this world. 
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often 
passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries. 
5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students 
is nonsense. 
6. 
7. 
b. Most students don't realize the extent to which 
their grades are influenced by accidental 
happenings. 
a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an 
effective leader. 
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have 
not taken advantage of their opportunities. 
a. No matter how hard you try some people just 
don't like you. 
b. People who can't get others to like them don't 
understand how to get along with others. 
8. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining 
one's personality. 
b. It is one's experiences in life which determine 
what they're like. 
{l'.J.) 
E 9. a. I have often fo·md that what h; going to 
happen will happen. 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well 
for me as making a decision to take a dcf initc 
course of action. 
a. In the case of the well prepared student there 
is rarely if ever such a thing as nn unfair test. 
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so un-
related to course work that studying is really 
useless. 
a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, 
luck has little or nothing to do with it. 
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in 
the right place at the right time. 
a. The average citizen can have an influence in 
government decisions. 
b. This world is run by the few people in t>ow~r, 
and there is not much the little guy can do 
about it. 
a. When I r:hlke plans, I .ll':l cllrnost certain tlh1t I 
can make them work. 
b. It is not alwayn wise to pl.1n too far ;ihcad 
because m.1ny things turn out to be a r:l.ltter 
of good or bad fortune anyhow. 
14. a. There arc certain people who .1rc junt no <;ood. 
There is sorr.e good in everybody. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
-b. 
a. In my case getting wh~t I want ha5 little or 
ncthing to do with luck. 
b. Many times we might junt as well decide what 
to do by flipping a coin. 
a. Who gets to be the boss often depcndc on wr.o 
was lucky enough to be in the right place f ir5t. 
b. Getting people to do the right thing dcpc~d5 upon 
ability~ luck has little or nothing to do with it. 
a. As far as world affairs arc concerned, ~o5t of 
us arc the victi~s o! !orces we can neither 
understand, nor control. 
b. Dy taking an actn·c part in political .1nd social 
affairs the people can control world cvcnt5. 
a. ~est people can't realize the extent to which 
their lives arc controlled by accidental happenings. 
b. There rcall7 is no such thing as "luc~". 
19. a. one should always be willing to ad~it his ~istakes. 
--b. It is usually best to cover up one's ~ista>;cs. 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
a. It is hard to know whether or not a person 
really likes you. 
·b. How many friends you have depends upon how 
nice a person you are. 
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a. In the long run the bad things that happen to 
us are balanced by the good ones. 
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of 
ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three. 
a. With enough effort we can wipe out political 
corruption. 
b. It is difficult for people to have much control 
over the things politicians do in office. 
a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive 
at the grades they give. 
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I 
study and the grades I get. 
24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for 
themselves what they should do. 
25. 
26. 
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what 
their jobs are. 
a. Many times I feel that I have little influence 
over the things that happen to me. 
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance 
or luck plays an important role in my life. 
a. People are lonely because they don't try to be 
friendly. 
b. There's not much use in trying too hard to 
please people, if they like you, they like you. 
27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in 
high school. 
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build 
character. 
28. a. What happens to me is my own doing. 
E ~-b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough 
control over the direction my life is taking. 
E 29. a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians 
behave the way they do. 
b. In the long run the people are responsible for 
bad government on a national as well as on a 
local level. 
APPENDIX B 
The Crandall Intellectual Achievement Responsibility 
Questionnaire and Scoring Instructions 
{77.) 
Internal alternatives are denoted by an I and the test 
is scored in an internal direction. Positive-events items are 
indicated by a plus sign, and+negative events by a minus sign 
following the I. A child's I score is the sum of all po~itive 
events for which he assumes credit, and his I- score is the sum 
of all n~gative events for 'fhich h§ assumes blame. The total 
I score is the sum of the I and I subscales. 
The IAR Scale 
1. 
I+ 
2. 
I+ 
3. 
I 
4. 
I 
5. 
I+ 
6. 
I+ 
7. 
I 
8. 
I 
If a teacher passes you to the next grade, would it 
probably be 
(a) because she liked you, or 
(b) because of the work you did? 
When you do well in a test at school, is it more 
likely to be 
(a) because you studied for it, or 
(b) because the test was especially easy? 
When you have trouble understanding something in 
school, is it usually 
(a) becaus~ the teacher didn't explain it clearly, or 
(b) because you didn't listen carefully? 
When you read a story and can't remember much of it, 
is it usually 
·(a) because the story wasn't well written, or 
(b) because you weren't interested in the story? 
Suppose your parents say you are doing well in school. 
Is it likely to happen 
(a) because your school work is good, or 
(b) because they are in a good mood? 
Suppose you did better than usual in a subject at 
school. Would it probably happen 
(a) because you tried harder, or 
(b) because someone helped you? 
When you lose at a game of cards or checkers, does 
it usually happen 
(a) because the other player is good at the game, or 
(b) because you don't play well? 
Suppose a person doesn't think you are very bright 
or clever. 
(a) Can you make him change his mind if you try to, or 
(b) are there some people who will think you're not 
very bright no matter what you do? 
I+ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
If you solve a puzzle quickly, is it 
(a) because it wasn't a very hard puzzle, or 
(b) because you worked on it carefully? 
If a boy or girl tells you that you are dumb, is 
it more likely that they say that 
(a) because they are mad at you, or 
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(b) because what you did really wasn't very bright? 
Suppose you study to become a teacher, scientist, or 
doctor and you fail. Do you think this would happen 
(a) because you didn't work hard enough, or 
(b) because you needed some help and other people 
didn't give it to you? 
When you learn something quickly in school, is 
it usually 
(a) because you paid close attention, or 
(b) because the teacher explained it clearly? 
If a teacher says to you, "Your work is fine," is 
it 
(a) 
(b) 
something teachers usually say to encourage 
pupils, or 
because you did a good job? 
When you find it hard to work arithmetic or math 
problems at school, is it 
(a) because you didn't study well enough before you 
tried them, or 
(b) because the teacher gave problems that were too 
hard? 
When 
it 
(a) 
(b) 
you forget 'something you heard in class, is 
because the teacher didn't explain it very well, or 
because you didn't try very hard to remember? 
Suppose you weren't sure about the answer to a question 
your teacher asked you, but your answer turned out 
to be right. Is it likely to happen 
(a) because she wasn't as particular as usual, or 
(b) because you gave the best answer you could think of? 
When you read a story and remember most of it, is it 
usually , 
(a) because you were interested in the story, or 
(b) because the story was well written? 
18. If your parents tell you you're acting silly and not 
thinking clearly, is it more likely to be 
I (a) because of something you did, or 
(b) because they happen to be feeling cranky? 
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19. When you don't do well on a test at school, is it 
(a) because the test was especially hard, or 
I (b) because you didn't study for it? 
20. 
I+ 
21. 
I 
22. 
I 
23. 
I 
24. 
25. 
26. 
I 
27. 
I 
28. 
When you win at a game of cards or checkers, does 
it happen 
(a) because you play real well, or 
(b) because the other person doesn't play well? 
If people think you're bright or clever, is it 
(a) because they happen to like you, or 
(b) because you usually act that way? 
If a teacher didn't pass you to the next grade, 
would it probably be 
(a) because she "had it in for you," or 
(b) because your school work wasn't good enough? 
Suppose you don't do as well as usual in a subject at 
school. Would this probably happen 
(a) because you weren't as careful as usual, or 
(b) because somebody bothered you and kept you from 
working? 
If a boy or girl tells you that you are bright, is 
it usually 
(a) because you thought up a good idea, or 
(b) because they like you? 
Suppose you become a famous teacher, scientist, or 
doctor. Do you think this would happen 
(a) because other people helped you when you needed 
it, or 
(b) because you worked hard? 
Suppose your parents say you aren't doing well in 
your school work. Is this likely to happen more 
(a) because your work isn't very good, or 
(b) because they are feeling cranky? 
Suppose you are showing a friend how to play a game 
and he has trouble with it. Would that happen 
(a) because he wasn't able to understand how to 
play, or 
(b) because you couldn't explain it well? 
' 
When you find it easy to work arithmetic or math 
problems at school, it is usually 
(a) because the teacher gave you especially easy 
problems, or 
(b) because you studied your book well before you 
tried them? 
29. 
30. 
I 
31. 
32. 
33. 
I 
34. 
I 
(UO.) 
When you remember something you heard in class, is 
it usually 
(a) becau~e you tried hard to remember, or 
(b) because the teacher explained it well? 
If you can't work a puzzle, is it more likely to 
happen 
(a) because you are not especially good at working 
puzzles, or 
(b) because the instructions weren't written clearly 
enough? 
If your parents tell you that you are bright or 
cleaver, is it more likely 
(a) because they are feeling good, or 
(b) because of something you did? 
Suppose you are explaining how 
friend and he learns quickly. 
to play a game to a 
Would that happen more 
of ten 
(a) 
(b) 
because you explained it well, or 
because he was able to understand it? 
Suppose you're not sure about the answer to a 
question your teacher asks you and the answer you 
give turns out to be wrong. Is it likely to happen 
(a) because she was more particular than usual, or 
(b) because you answered too quickly? 
If a teacher says to you, "Try to do better," would 
it be 
(a) because this is something she might say to get 
pupils to try harder, or 
(b) because your work wasn't as good as usual? 
( 81.) 
APPENDIX C 
The IAR and Instructions as Used in the Present Study 
QUESTIONNAIRE 2 
This questionnaire describes a number of common experiences 
most of you have in your daily lives. These statements are 
presented one at a time, and following each are two possible 
answers. Read the description of the experience carefully, 
and then look at the two answers. Choose the one that most 
often describes what happens to you. Put a circle around the 
"A" or "B" in front of that answer. Be sure to answer each 
question according to how you really feel. 
If, at any time you are uncertain about the meaning of a 
question, raise your hand and the person who passed out the 
questionnaires will come and explain it to you. 
1. 
2. 
If a 
be 
{a) 
{b) 
When 
be 
{a) 
{b) 
teacher passes you to the next grade, would it probably 
because she liked you, or 
because of the work you did? 
you do well on a test at school, is it more likely to 
because you studied for it, or 
because the test was especially easy? 
3. When you have trouble understanding something in school, 
is it usually 
{a) because the teacher didn't explain it clearly, or 
{b) because you didn't listen carefully? 
4. When you read a story and can't remember much of it, is 
it usually 
{a) because the story wasn't well written, or 
{b) because you weren't interested in the story? 
5. Suppose your parents say you are doing well in school. 
Is it likely to happen 
{a) because your school work is good, or 
(b) because they are in a good mood? 
6. Suppose you did better than usual in a subject at school. 
Would it probably happen 
(a) because you tried harder, or 
(b) because someone helped you? 
7. When you lose at a game of cards or checkers, does it 
usually happen 
{a) because the other player is good at the game, or 
{b) because you don't play well? 
8. Suppose a person doesn't think you are very bright or 
clever. 
( 82.) 
{a) can you make him change his mind if you try to, or 
{b) are there some people who will think you're not very 
bright no matter what you do? 
9. If you solve a puzzle quickly, is it 
(a) because it wasn't a very hard puzzle, or 
{b) because you worked on it carefully? 
10. If a boy or girl tells you that you are dumb, is it more 
likely that they say that 
(a) because they are mad at you, or 
(b) because what you did really wasn't very bright? 
11. Suppose you study to become a teacher, scientist, or 
doctor and you fail. Do you think this would happen 
{a) because you didn't work hard enough, or 
{b) because you needed some help and other people 
didn't give it to you? 
12. When you learn something quickly in school, is it usually 
(a) because you paid close attention, or 
(b) because the teacher explained it clearly? 
13. If a teacher says to you, "Your work is fine," is it 
14. 
(a) something teachers usually say to encourage pupils, 
or 
{b) because you did a good job? 
When you find it hard to work arithmetic or math problems 
at school, is it 
(a) because you didn't study well enough before you 
tried them, or 
(b) because the teacher gave problems that were too hard? 
15. When you forget something you heard in class, is it 
(a) because the teacher didn't explain it very well, or 
(b) because you didn't try very hard to remember? 
16. Suppose you weren't sure about the answer to a question 
your teacher asked you, but your answer turned out to be 
right. Is it likely to happen 
(a) because she wasn't as particular as usual, or 
(b) because you gave the best answer you could think of? 
17. When you read a story and remember most of· it, is it 
usually 
(a) because you were interested in the story, or 
(b) because the story was well written? 
18. If your parents tell you you're acting silly and not 
thinking clearly, is it more likely to be 
(a) because of something you-did, or 
(b) because they happen to be feeling cranky? 
19. When you don't do well on a test at school, is it 
(a) because the test was especially hard, or 
(b) because you didn't study for it? 
20. When you win at a game of cards or checkers, does it 
happen 
(a) because you play real well, or 
(b) because the other person doesn't play well? 
21. If people think you're bright or clever, is it 
(a) because they happen to like you, or 
(b) because you usually act that way? 
(83.) 
22. If a teacher didn't pass you to the next grade, would it 
probably be 
(a) because she "had it in for you," or 
(b) because your school work wasn't good enough? 
23. Suppose you don't do as well as usual in a subject at 
school. Would this probably happen 
(a) because you weren't as careful as usual, or 
(b) because somebody bothered you and kept you from 
working? 
24. If a boy or girl tells you that you are bright, is it 
usually 
(a) because you thought up a good idea, or 
(b) because they like you? 
25. Suppose you became a famous teacher, scientist, or doctor. 
26. 
Do you think this would happen 
(a) because other people helped you when you needed it,or 
(b) because you worked hard? 
Suppose your 
school work. 
(a) because 
(b) because 
parents say you aren't doing well 
Is this likely to happen more 
your work isn't very good, or 
they are feeling cranky? 
in your 
27. Suppose you are showing a friend how to play a game and he 
has trouble with it. Would that happen 
(a) because he wasn't able to understand how to play, or 
(b) because you couldn't explain it well? 
28. When you find it easy to work arithmetic or math problems 
at school, is it usually 
(a) because the teacher gave you especially easy problems, or 
(b) because you studied your book well before you tried them? 
( 84.) 
29. When you remember something you heard in class, is it usually 
(a) because you tried hard to remember, or. 
(b) because the teacher explained it well? 
30. If you can't work a puzzle, is it more likely to happen 
(a) because you are not especially good at working 
puzzles, or 
(b) because the instructions weren't written clearly enough? 
31. If your parents tell you that you are bright or clever, is 
it more likely 
(a) because they are feeling good, or 
(b) because of something you did? 
32. Suppose you are explaining how to play a game to a friend 
and he learns quickly. Would that happen more often 
(a) because you explained it well, or 
(b) because he was able to understand it? 
33. Suppose you're not sure about the answer to a question 
your teacher asks you and the answer you giv~ turns out 
to be wrong. Is it likely to happen 
(a) because she was more particular than usual, or 
(b) because you answered too quickly? 
34. If a teacher says to you, "Try to do better," would it be 
(a) because this is something she might say to get pupils 
to try harder, or 
(b) because your work wasn't as good as usual? 
,--
APPENDIX D 
Epstein and Komorita's 
Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure 
Scoring Instructions 
( 8 5. ) 
This scale consists of 14 items to which the subject 
indicates his agreement or disagreement on a 4-point scale 
(from "very much agree" to "very much disagree"). Scoring 
consists of differentially weighting the alternatives of each 
item in the direction of external control. An I before the 
item indicates that agreement with the statement is internal 
control. An E before the item indicates that agreement with 
the statement is external control. The instructions ask the 
child to answer the items in direct relation to his perfor-
mance on the task. The stems of the items are the following: 
I 1. It depends on how carefully you work. 
I 2. It depends on how much confidence you have in yourself. 
E 3. It depends on whet.her thP. person testing you likes you 
or does not like you. 
E 4. It depends on whether you feel well or not well. 
I 5. It depends on how much hope you have. 
I 6. It depends on how much good or bad luck you have. 
I 7. It depends on how alert you are during the game. 
I 8. It depends on how much you care about the game. 
I 9. It depends on how much ability you have. 
E 10. It does not depend on how carefully you work. 
E 11. It does not depend on how much you believe you will 
do well. 
E 12. It has nothing to do with how much you pay attention 
to the game (task). 
E 13. It does not depend on how much you think about the game. 
E 14. It does not depend on how well you understand the game. 
Instructions used by Epstein and Komorita (197~ were the 
following: 
Thisgame has been played by other children. After they 
played, some children found out they had done well and 
others found out they had done poorly. When these 
children were asked "why did you do well or poorly?" 
they gave the following reasons. As you read each 
reason, remember whether you did well or poorly. 
Then, show how much you agree or disagree with the 
reason. 
(86.) 
~--
APPE?H>IX E 
The Locus of Control Scale for Success-failure 
As Used for the Pre-Test 
QUEST I om:,\ I RE 1 
( U7.) 
This task was performed by other children. After they 
finished, some children found out they had done well and 
others found out they had done poorly. When thcne children 
were asked "Why did you do well or poorly?" they g.·wc the 
following reasons. As you read each reason think about how 
well or how poorly you would expect to do on thin task. Then, 
show how much you agree or disagree with the rcaoon by circling 
the number which is closest to what you believe. 
1. It depends on how carefully you work. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 .; (very much dicagrcc) 
2. It depends on how much conf idcncc you have in yourself. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 .; (very much di n<1g rec) 
3. It depends on whether the person testing you likea you 
or does not like you. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 .; (very l':l.UCh dii:;.1grec) 
4. It depends en whether you feel well or not .,,,.c 11. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (very r:';UCh di::i.19rcc) 
s. It depends on how r:mch hope you have. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 {very l':l.UCh dir;.1grce) 
6. It depends on hO" ... r.:uch good or b.id luck you h,l\'C. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 • (very r.iUCh c! i :rn c; r cc) .. 
7. It depends on how alert you arc during the t.1of:. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 • (very r.:uch din.lgrcc) .. 
8. It depends on how r:iuch you care <lbout the t.1nJ.:. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (•;cry ~uch <.! i 1;.19 rec) 
9. It depends on how r::uch ability j'Oi.l have. 
(very r:iUCh agree) 1 2 3 • (very r.:uch din.lgrcc) .. 
10. It docs not depend on ho..,. carcfullj• ~·ou •..:ori:. 
(very r:iUch agree) 1 2 3 4 (very r.:uch din.igrcc) 
11. It docs not depend on ho·,: r"~UC!l you believe :;ou • .. · i 11 do .,..cl 1. 
(very r.iuch agree) 1 2 3 • (very r:.uch di5.JCj!."CC) .. 
12. It has nothing to do with ho· .. · r.-uch you pilj' attention to the 
task. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 ' (,:cr~l r.uch dis.igrc!!) .. 
(88.) 
13. It does not depend on how much you think about the task. 
(very much agree} 1 2 3 4 (very much disagree} 
14. It does not depend on how well you understand the task. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (very much disagree) 
APPENDIX F 
The Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure 
As Used for the Post-Test 
QUESTIONNAIRE 1 
( 8 9.) 
This task was performed by other children. After they 
finished, some children found out they had done well and others 
found out they had done poorly. When these children were asked 
"Why did you do well or poorly?" they gave the following reasons. 
As you read each reason think about how well or how poorly you 
think you did on this task. Then, show how much you agree 
or disagree with the reason by circling the number which is 
closest to what you believe. 
1. It depends on how carefully you work. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (very much disagree) 
2. It depends on how much confidence you have in yourself. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (very much disagree) 
3. It depends on whether the person testing you likes you or 
does not like you. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (very much disagree) 
4. It depends on whether you feel well or not well. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (very much disagree) 
5. It depends on how much hope you have. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 '(very much disagree) 
6. It depends on how much good or bad luck you have. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (very much disagree) 
7. It depends on how alert you are during the task. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (very much disagree) 
8. It depends on how much you care about the task. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (very much disagree) 
9. It depends on how much ability you have. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (very much disagree) 
10. It does not depend on how carefully you work. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 Cv,ery much disagree) 
11. It does not depend on how much you believe you will do well. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (very much disagree) 
12. It has nothing to do with how much you pay attention to the tas 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (very much disagree) 
13. It does not depend on how much you think about the task. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (very much disagree) 
14. It does not depend on how well you understand the task. 
(very much agree) 1 2 3 4 (very much disagree) 
( 9 u. ) 
APPENDIX G 
Sample Task 
This experiment studied what people do when they see 
someone hurt. It was done in the downtown area of a big city 
where there were a lot of people walking by. The person doing 
the experiment had one of his helpers make believe they fell 
down and then they cried out for help. This person was called 
the victim, and sometimes a man was used and sometimes a woman. 
Some people stopped to help and some just walked by. The 
experimenter asked these people to come to his off ice to 
talk to him and take tests to measure how smart they were, 
their fearfulness, and their confidence in themselves. After 
doing this 25 times, the person doing the experiment discovered 
that: 
1. More people stopped to help when the victim was a woman. 
---
2. The people who stopped were smarter than those who 
--- just walked by. 
3. The main reason people gave for why they stopped to help 
--- was that they would want someone to help them if they 
were hurt. 
4. More women stopped to help than men. 
5. The average age of the people who stopped to help 
was younger than those who passed by. 
6. The people who walked by were more fearful than those 
who stopped to help. 
7. When the victim was a man, more women stopped to help 
than men. 
8. The main reason people gave for not stopping was that 
--- they were afraid to get involved. 
9. The people who stopped to help were more confident. 
---
10. Most of the people who stopped to help were or had 
been members of the Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts. 
APPENDIX H 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SAMPLE TASK 
( 91.) 
Read the experiment very carefully. Below the experiment 
are listed ten things that might have been discovered in the 
experiment. Your task is to decide which of the ten things 
really were discovered in the experiment and which were not. 
Write TRUE in the space in front of the statement if you think 
that it really was discovered in the experiment. Write FALSE 
in the space in front of the statement if you think that it 
was not found in the experiment~ There could be any number 
of true or false statements. 
(92.) 
APPENDIX I 
Skill (Personal Control) Oriented Instruction Sheet 
Read the experiment very carefully. Below the experiment 
are listed ten things that might have been discovered in the 
experiment. Your task is to decide which of the ten things 
really were discovered in the experiment and which were not. 
Write TRUE in the space in front of the statement if you think 
that it really was discovered in the experiment. Write FALSE 
in the space in front of the statement if you think that it 
was not found in the experimeni. There could be any number 
of true or false statements. 
You will be given three experiments. Please hand each back 
to me when you are finished so that I may examine it. 
Based on what you know about people you should be able 
to figure out what was really discovered in these experiments 
and what was not. There are connections between the experiments 
and what was really discovered in them which make sense if 
you can figure them out. 
Before going on, please answer the following questions. 
1. How important is this task to you? 
(NOT IMPORTANT) l 2 3 4 5 6 7 (IMPORTANT) 
2. How important is it that you do well on this task? 
(NOT IMPORTANT) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (IMPORTANT) 
3. How well do you think you will do on this task? 
(VERY POORLY) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (VERY WELL) 
( 9 3. ) 
APPENDIX J 
Chance {No Personal Control) Oriented Instruction Sheet 
Read the experiment very carefully. Below the experiment 
are listed ten things that might have been discovered in the 
experiment. Your task is to decide which of the ten things 
really were discovered in the experiment and which were not. 
Write TRUE in the space in front of the statement if you think 
that it really was discovered in the experiment. Write FALSE 
in the space in front of the statement if you think that it 
was not found in the experiment. There could be any number 
of true or false statements. 
You will be given three experiments. Please hand each back 
to me when you are finished so that I may examine it. 
You have little to base your decisions on in this task. 
The connections between the experiments and what was really 
discovered in them don't always make sense. How well you do 
on this task is a matter of guess-work. 
Before going on, please answer the following questions. 
1. How important is this task to you? 
(NOT IMPORTANT) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (IMPORTANT) 
2. How important is it that you do well on this task? 
(NOT IMPORTANT) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (IMPORTANT) 
3. How well do you think you will do on this task? 
(VERY POORLY) 1 2 3 4 5 h 7 (VERY WELL) 
( 9 4 • ) 
APPENDIX K 
No Control Orientation Biased Instruction Sheet 
Read the experiment very carefully. Below the experiment 
are listed ten things that might have be~n discovered in the 
experimPnt. Your task is to decide which of the ten things 
really were discovered in the experiment and which were not. 
Write TRUE in the space in front of the statement if you think 
that it really was discovered in the experiment. Write FALSE 
in the space in front of the statement if you think that it 
was not found in the experiment. There could be any number 
of true or false statements. 
You will be given three experiments. Please hand each 
back to me when you are finished so that I may examine it. 
Before going on, please answer the following questions. 
1. How important is this task to you? 
(NOT IMPORTANT) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (IMPORTANT) 
2. How important is it that you do well on this task? 
(NOT IMPORTANT) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (IMPORTANT) 
3. How well do you think you will do on this task? 
(VERY POORLY) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (VERY WELL) 
(95.) 
APPENDIX L 
Experimental.Task 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 (Trials) 
EXPERIMENT 1 
This experiment studied people taking chances. A group 
of college students who were studying about business were asked 
to play a game in which they made believe that they invested 
money in real business. The teacher kept track of how much 
money the students would actually have made or lost by look-
ing at the stock market page of the newspaper each day. Each 
student started out with $2,000.00 of play money. Each day 
the students could buy or sell stocks. The game lasted two 
months. They were told that the three students that made 
the most money would get A's in the course. The students all 
took tests and answered questions about themselves; how smart 
they were, how much they liked themselves, how much they 
liked other people, and how good a leader they were. It was 
discovered in this experiment that: 
~~-
1. People who take a lot of chances with money don't 
1 i k e themselves very much. 
2. On rainy days the students usually lost money. 
~~-
3. The smartest students made the most money. 
~~-
4. No one ever made any money on Fridays. 
~~-
5. Students who said they didn't like other people 
~~-
very much didn't take many chances with their money. 
6. The students who were the best leaders took the 
~~- biggest and most chances with their money. 
7. The students who lost all their money were poor 
~~- leaders. 
~~-
~~-
(96.) 
8. The students who said they didn't like other people 
very much usually put their money in a bank where 
it would be safe but where they wouldn't make very 
much. 
9. None of the students made any money. 
10. The three students who got A's in the course all said 
they liked themselves very much. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
This experiment studied how and why people change their 
attitudes or beliefs. The person doing the experiment was 
trying to find out what would be the best way to change people's 
attitude toward dental care. A group of 100 people were asked 
a series of questions about how well they took care of their 
teeth. These questions gave information about how the people 
brushed their teeth, used dental floss, went to the dentist, 
and so forth. Fifty of these people were shown a film which 
tried to scare them into taking better care of their teeth by 
showing pictures of rotten teeth, diseased gums, and dentists 
pulling out teeth. The other half of the people were shown a 
film which merely explained how to take better care of your 
teeth and showed examples of the proper way to brush and use 
floss. After one week and again after six months the people 
were asked the same questions about how well they took care 
of their teeth and how important they felt this was. It was 
discovered in this experiment that: 
~~-
1. People who saw the scary film changed their beliefs 
more than the people who saw the film which just 
gave explanations and examples. 
(Y7.) 
2. Children under age 12 changed their attitudes more 
~~- than adults. 
~~-
3. People who saw the film which gave explanations and 
examples said they had better dental habits at the 
end of one week but were back to their same old 
habits after six months. 
4. People who saw the scary film got worse in their 
~~- dental habits. 
~~-5. Adults over 21 years of age changed very little in 
their beliefs. 
~~-6. Of the people who saw the scary film, the females 
changed most. 
~~-
7. The people who saw the scary film reported better 
dental habits after one week and had changed even 
more so after six months. 
~~-
8. Most of the people went to the dentist within one week 
9. Most of the children under age 12 who saw the scary 
~~- film refused to go to the dentist afterwards. 
10. Most of the people said the films didn't affect them 
one way or the other. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
This experiment studied different methods of teaching. 
There were three ninth grade classes at three different schools 
which took part. Each class was taught by a different method . 
. 
In class A the teacher always told the students what to do 
and how to do it. In class B the teacher and the students 
worked together to plan things. In class C the students did 
everything by themselves, the teacher only answered questions 
or helped out when she was asked to. At the end of one month 
all of the classes took tests to see how much they had learned. 
The students were also asked to rate on a ten point scale how 
,-----
( 9 8.) 
much they liked school. What was discovered in this experiment 
was: 
1. There were more absences for students in class C. 
---
2. Class A made the highest grades on the tests at the 
--- end of the month. 
---
3. The girls in all three classes said they liked school 
more than the boys. 
---
4. The students in class C did very well in History but 
very poorly in Math. 
5. The students in class B liked school more than the 
---
students in the other two classes. 
6. The teacher in class C reported more fights and 
--- behavior problems than the other two teachers. 
7. Class B had the poorest grades on the tests at the 
--- end of the month. 
8. The students in class A liked school less than the 
--- students in the other two classes. 
9. The students in class C decided to play games and 
--- didn't learn anything. 
10. There was little difference in the thr.ee classes on 
the tests they took at the end of the month. 
( 9 9. ) 
APPENDIX M 
Informed Consent· Form 
The purpose of this form is to help you understand what 
will happen during this experiment. You are a volunteer and 
may decide to stop and not take part at any time. 
The goal of this experiment is to explore the factors 
that students believe to be important in determining the 
outcome of things that they do, for instance, whether they 
are successful or not. The experiment will consist of two 
sessions (approximately 45 minutes each) about two weeks apart. 
You will be asked to fill out two questionnaires which ask you 
to answer questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about 
what you believe to· be important in bringing about the things 
that happen to you, your successes and/or failures. These 
questions are not generally considered to be very personal in 
nature. An example of this type of question is: 
When you play a game and lose, do you lose* 
(a) because you just didn't play well, or 
(b) because the game was hard? 
I will meet with you individually for the second session and 
you will be asked to perform a simple task. This will consist 
of reading brief summaries of a few experiments and trying to 
pick out from a list what was actually discovered in the 
experiment. 
All of the information you give about yourself and how 
you do on the task will be held in strict confidence. All 
answer sheets and anything that may connect a given individual 
with a questionnaire or task performance will be destroyed as 
soon as the results have been tabulated. There will be a 
time at the end of the experiment when you can ask any questions 
you have about the experiment. 
Your signature on this form means that you understand the 
basic goals and procedures of this experiment and that you 
volunteer to participate. You may decide to cease participa-
tion at any time, and you may ask that any of the information 
you have given not be used. It in no way means that you have 
given up any of your legal rights. 
Signed 
Date 
*Item #9. from the Stanford Preschool Internal-External Scale 
(Mischel, Zeiss, and Zeiss, 1974). 
(100.) 
APPENDIX N 
Debriefing 
Some people think that how well they do or what happens 
to them depends on their own abilities or talents. Other 
people think that luck or what the people around them do to 
them is most important. And some people are kind of in 
between. This experiment studied how these kinds of beliefs 
might change. 
Some of the students who took part in this experiment 
were told that they could figure out the right answers on the 
task, some were told they would have to depend on guess-work, 
and some weren't told anything about what was important for 
doing well. Also, some of the students were told that they 
did very well on the task, some that they did very poorly, 
and some weren't told anything about how they did. Actually, 
the experiments were all made up and there were no real right 
or wrong answers. 
Please do not talk to anyone about this experiment until 
after everyone has taken part. If you do, it could make the 
results false and your time would have been wasted. 
Thank you very much for taking part in this experiment. 
Your efforts are very valuable. If you have any questions, 
please ask them. I will be happy to try to ahswer them. 
Thank, you again. 
(101.) 
APPENDIX 0 
Tables for Analysis of Locu·s of Control Scale 
For Success-Failure Scores 
TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations 
Pre Test Post Test 
M S.D. M S.D. 
Skill Instructions 
Success feedback 25.333 3.882 25.5 1. 871 
Failure feedback 22.833 2.317 29.5 7.204 
No feedback 28.333 4.719 27.667 7.23 
Chance Instructions 
Success feedback 24.667 3.386 24.5 3.937 
Failure feedback 24.667 3.777 30 6.542 
No feedback 23.167 3.189 24 4.69 
No Control Orientation 
Success feedback 24.83 2.994 , 23 3.847 
Failure feedback 26.5 6.656 28.333 7.685 
No feedback 27.17 4.215 26.833 7.705 
TABLE 2: Summary of Instructions x Feedback X Trials Analysis 
Source SS df MS F p 
Total 2919.213 107 
Between Subjects 1975.713 53 
Instructions 19.685 2 9.843 <1 N.S. 
Feedback 154.296 2 77.148 2.07 N.S. 
I X F 124.315 4 31.079 <l N.S. 
Error 1677.417 45 37.276 
Within suBjects 943.5 54 
Trials 26.009 1 26.009 1. 729 N.S. 
Trials x Instruc-
tions 20.13 2 10.065 <:l N.S. 
Trials X feedback 188.741 2 94.37 6.275* <. 005 
T X I X F 31. 87 4 7.968 <l N.S. 
Error 676.75 
w 
45 1.5. 0 39, 
*F = 2~5875 95, 4, 45 
TABLE 3: Simple Effects, Trials by Groups 
(Success Versus Failure) 
(102.) 
Source SS df MS F p 
Groups 
Trials 
Trials X Groups 
Error (Total) 
w 
144.5 
40.5 
174.222 
676.75 
1 
45 
174.222 11.585* <.005 
15.039 
*F = 4. 06 
• 9 5 ,1, 4 5 
TABLE 4: Simple Effects, Trials by Groups 
(Success Versus No Feedback) 
Source SS df MS F 
Groups 76.056 
Trials 12 
Trials X Groups 11.389 1 11. 389 <. 1 
Error (Total) 676.75 45 15.039 w 
TABLE 5: Simple Effects, Trials by Groups 
(Failure Versus No Feedback) 
Source 
Groups 
Trials 
Trials X Groups 
Error (Total) 
w 
*F95, 1 45 = 4.06 , 
TABLE 6: 
Source 
Trials for Group 1 
(success) 
Errorw (Total) 
SS 
10.889 
93.389 
98 
676.75 
df 
1 
45 
Simple Effects, Trials 
(Success) 
SS df 
23.361 1 
676.75 45 
MS F 
98 6.516* 
15.039 
by Group 1 
.MS F 
23.361 1. 553 
15.039 
p 
N.S. 
p 
<.025 
E 
N.S. 
Source 
Trials 
TABLE 7: Simple Effects, Trials by Group 2 
(Failure) 
SS df MS F 
for Group 2 
(Failure) 191.361 1 191.361 12.724* 
Error (Total) 
w 
676.75 45 15.039 
*F95, = 4.06 1, 45 
TABLE 8: Simple.Effects, Trials by Groups 3 
(No Feedback) 
Source SS df MS F 
Trials by Group 3 
(No feedback) .028 1 .028 <1 
Error (Total) 
w 
676.75 45 15.039 
(103.) 
p 
<. 001 
p 
N.S. 
TABLE 9: Simple Effects, Feedback Groups at Pre-Test 
Source SS df MS F p 
Total 902.833 53 
Between Groups 24.778 2 12.389 <1 N.S. 
Within Groups 878.056 51 17.217 
TABLE 10: Simple Effects, Feedback Groups at Post-Test 
Source SS df MS F p 
----
Total 1990.37 53 
Between Groups 318.259 2 159.13 4.854* <.OS 
Within Groups 1672.111 51 32.786 
*F 95, 2, 51 = 3.186 
r---
TABLE 11: Summary of Neuman-Keuls' Multiple-Range Test 
Group 2 (Failure) Versus Group 3 (No Feedback) 
c. diff .2 = 3.844 
29.278 - 26.167 = 3.111 (not significant) 
Group 3 (No Feedback) Versus Group 1 (Success) 
c. diff .2 = 3.844 
26.167 - 23.333 = 2.834 (not significant) 
Group 1 (Success) Versus Group 2 (Failure) 
c. diff.3 = 4.613 
29.278 - 23.333 = 5.945 (significant) 
(10'1.) 
,-------
{105.) 
APPENDIX P 
Tables for Analysis of IAR - Total I Score 
TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations 
Pre-Test Post-Test 
M S.D. M S.D. 
Skill Instructions 
Success Feedback 24 2.53 27.667 2.582 
Failure Feedback 26.167 2.858 26.667 4.131 
No Feedback 25.167 3.545 25.667 3.386 
Chance Instructions 
Success Feedback 24.667 4.502 26.167 3.545 
Failure Feedback 26.167 1. 941 26 4.195 
No Feedback 26.5 1. 517 27.333 3.141 
No Control Orientation 
Success Feedback 26.667 2.944 26.5 3.017 
Failure Feedback 24.833 3.125 28.167 1. 4 72 
No Feedback 27.167 1. 472 26.667 4.502 
TABLE 2: Summary of Instructions X Feedback X Trials Analysis 
Source SS df MS F 
_P_ 
Total 1021.213 107 
Between 667.72 53 
Instructions 11. 358 2 5.659 <1 N.S. 
Feedback 4.581 2 2.29 <.l N.S. 
I X F 16.237 4 4.059 <l N.S. 
ErrorB 635.583 45 14.124 
Within 353.493 54 
Trials 30.09 1 30.09 5.042* <. 05 
T X I 10.271 2 5.136 <1 N.S. 
T X F 9.049 2 4.524 <1 N.S. 
T X I x F 35.507 4 8.877 1.487 N.S. 
Errorw 268.577 45 5.968 
*F95, = 4.06 1, 45 
(106.) 
APPENDIX Q 
Tables for Analysis of IAR - I+ Subscale Scores 
TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations 
Pre-Test Post-Test 
M SD M SD 
Skill Instructions 
Success Feedback 13.167 1. 329 13.833 1. 722 
Failure Feedback 13.667 1. 862 13.833 1.722 
No Feedback 13 2.966 12.667 2.733 
Chance Instructions 
Success Feedback 12.667 2.582 12.833 2.137 
Failure Feedback 14.333 .517 13.833 1. 472 
No Feedback 13.17 1. 472 13.33 2.066 
No Control Orientation 
Success Feedback 13.5 2,168 13.5 2.811 
Failure Feedback 12.5 2.074 14.33 1. 751 
No Feedback 14.17 .983 14 2 
TABLE 2: Summary of Instructions X Feedback x Trials Analysis 
Source SS df MS F p 
'l1otal 396.852 107 
Between 260.852 53 
Instructions 2.241 2 1.12 ~l N.S. 
Feedback 4.796 2 2.398 <l N.S. 
I X F 14.648 4 3.662 <. 1 N.S. 
Error 239.167 45 5.315 
Withinb 136 54 
Trials 1. 333 1 1. 333 <'.l N.S. 
T X I 1. 722 2 .861 <l N.S. 
T X F 1. 722 2 .861 <l N.S. 
T X I x F 8.056 4 2.014 <1 N.S. 
Error 123.167 45 2.737 
w 
I -------------------------------------------- ---------- -- ---
- -------
(107.) 
APPENDIX R 
Tables for Analysis of IAR - I Subscale Scores 
TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations 
Pre-Test Post-Test 
M SD M SD 
Skill Instructions 
Success Feedback 10.833 1. 472 13.833 1. 472 
Failure Feedback 12.5 1. 517 12.833 2.858 
No Feedback 12.167 .983 13 2.098 
Chance Instructions 
Success Feedback 12 2.098 13.333 1.751 
Failure Feedback 11. 333 1. 835 12.167 3.189 
No Feedback 13.33 1.366 14 1.549 
No Control Orientation 
Success Feedback 13 .17 1.329 13 1.549 
Failure Feedback 12.33 2.338 13.83 1.472 
No Feedback 13 1. 549 12.67 3.386 
TABLE 2: Summary of Analysis of IAR - I Subscale 
Source SS df MS F 
_P_ 
Total 421. 213 107 
Between 269.713 53 
Instructions 4.019 2 2.009 <1 
Feedback 3.852 2 1. 926 <l 
I X F 14.259 4 3.565 <l 
ErrorB 247.583 45 5.502 
Within 151.5 54 
Trials 18.75 1 18.75 7.819* <. 01 
T X I 5.056 2 2.528 1. 054 N.S. 
T X F 4.667 2 2.33 <1 
T X I x F 15.111 4 3.778 1.575 N.S. 
Error 107.917 45 2.398 
w 
*F95, = 4.06 1, 45 
(108.) 
APPENDIX S 
Tables for Analysis of Task Motivation 
Question 1: How Important Is This Task to You? 
TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations 
M SD 
Skill Instructions 
Success Feedback 4.833 1. 835 
Failure Feedback 4 1. 673 
No Feedback 5 .632 
Chance Instructions 
Success Feedback 5 1. 673 
Failure Feedback 5.167 1. 472 
No Feedback 4 1. 789 
No Control Orientation 
Success Feedback 5 1. 414 
Failure Feedback 4.667 1.211 
No Feedback 4.333 2.161 
TABLE 2: Summary of Instructions X Feedback Analysis 
Source SS df MS F 
_p_ 
Total 124 53 
Instructions .111 2 .056 .022 N.S. 
Feedback 2.333 2 1.167 .459 N.S. 
I X F 7.222 4 1. 806 .711 N.S. 
Error 114.333 45 2.541 
(109.) 
APPENDIX T 
Tables for Analysis of Task Motivation 
Question 2: How Important Is It That You Do Well On This Task? 
TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations 
M SD 
Skill Instructions 
Success Feedback 5.167 1. 329 
Failure Feedback 4.333 1. 751 
No Feedback 6.5 .837 
Chance Instructions 
Success Feedback 4.5 1. 871 
Failure Feedback 5.667 1. 862 
No Feedback 4.667 1. 033 
No Control Orientation 
Success Feedback 5 1. 897 
Failure Feedback 5.333 1. 211 
No Feedback 5.5 1.871 
TABLE 2: Summary of Instructions X Feedback Analysis 
Source SS df MS F 
_P_ 
Total 128.148 53 
Instructions 1. 593 2 .796 <1 N.S. 
Feedback 4.148 2 2.074 <l N.S. 
I X F 15.741 4 3.935 1.66 N.S. 
Error 106.667 45 2.37 
,---- -----------------------------------------------
(110.) 
APPENDIX U 
Tables for Analysis of Task Motivation 
Question 3: How Well Do You Think You Will Do On This Task? 
TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations 
M SD 
Skill Instructions 
Success Feedback 4.5 .548 
Failure Feedback 4.333 1. 033 
No Feedback 5.667 1.033 
Chance Instructions 
Success Feedback 4.333 .817 
Failure Feedback 4.5 .837 
No Feedback 3.833 .409 
No Control Orientation 
Success Feedback 4.667 .817 
Failure Feedback 4.833 .753 
No Feedback 4.833 .983 
TABLE 2: Sununary of Instructions x Feedback Analysis 
Source SS df MS F 
_£___ 
Total 46.833 53 
Instructions 4.111 2 2.056 2.656 N.S. 
Feedback .778 2 .389 <: 1 N.S. 
I X F 7.111 4 1. 778 2.297 N.S. 
Error 34.833 45 .774 
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